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The MedSouth Joint-(Ad)venture
The Antitrust Implications of Virtual Health Care
Networks
Andrew S. Oldham*
I. INTRODUCTION

The health care industry remains in the throes of regulatory,
technological, and competitive flux; as a result of the industry's dynamism,
health care antitrust continues to clamor through its own "Copernican
Revolution." 1 Payers' continued cost-cutting, our society's continued
demographic graying, and providers' continued innovations in delivery
strategies have converged to create unprecedented pressures toward
horizontal consolidation and structural change within managed care
networks and independent physician practices.2 Antitrust policy has
* J.D. Candidate & John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School
(2005); M.Phil., Cambridge University (2002); B.A., University of Virginia (2001). I am
grateful to the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard University
for financial support, and I am deeply appreciative for Professor Troy Brennan's many
helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Additionally, I am grateful to Kevin Reed,
the Director of DATABANK Program Services for the Colorado Health & Hospital
Association, for his invaluable assistance in compiling hospital data for this project. Of
course, any errors that remain are my own. © Andrew Oldham, 2004. All rights reserved.
1. See William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?:A
Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 246 (2002)

("advances in both medical care and econometrics over the past half-century have placed
greater demands on antitrust policy to generate competition not only on price and output, but
also on linear quality, choice, and innovation, and have highlighted the absence of a
workable model for evaluating these price-quality and quality-quality tradeoffs. Similarly,
the expansion of public funding for health care and the social consequences of restricted
access to insurance or services have not been incorporated logically into competition policy,
though they indisputably influence the evolution of medical markets.").
2.

See W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 195 (3d ed.

2000) ("The merger wave of the 1990s appears to be different from the LBOs [leveraged
buy-outs] of the 1980s. Many mergers seem to be taking place in industries in the midst of or
anticipating deregulation: electric power, telecommunications, and banking and financial
services. Because of structural changes and enhanced competition, mergers are made in
order to gain entry to new markets. In pharmaceuticals, mergers between direct competitors
have been made in order to gain economies of scale and scope. Downsizing and
consolidation are other factors in mergers taking place in the defense and health-care
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struggled to keep pace.3 After a quarter-century in the shadows of larger,
more integrated, and generally more efficient health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), 4 smaller groups of physicians-such as individual
practice associations (IPAs) 5-have finally begun to level the managed care
playing field.6 However, to pose a truly competitive threat to HMOs, WAs
will require regulators and policymakers to rethink the application of
traditional antitrust principles to modern health care markets.7
In an effort to modernize its increasingly obsolete and untenable policy
assumptions, 8 and to respond to the ever-changing managed care landscape,
industries.").
3. Sage & Hammer, supra note 1, at 248-60 (decrying the flawed premises of traditional
antitrust as applied to modem health care markets and describing traditional antitrust
enforcement and oversight of health care financing and delivery as "Ptolemaic
Competition").
4.

See MOLLY SHAPIRO, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HMOs AND THE PATIENT'S

BILL OF RIGHTS 9 (1999) ("A Health Maintenance Organization is an organized system of
health care which provides or arranges for a comprehensive array of basic and supplemental
health care services. These services are provided on a prepaid basis to voluntarily enrolled
members living within a prescribed geographic area. Responsibility for the delivery, quality
and payment of health care falls to the managing organization-the HMO.").
5. See generally Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1233-35 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (describing the specifics of the formation and operation of IPAs).
6. See Carl F. Ameringer, Devolution and Distrust: Managed Care and the Resurgence
of Physician Power and Authority, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 187, 187-88 (2002)
(arguing that "[the decline of organized medicine as a political force in the latter half of the
twentieth century" is one of several "clear signs that physicians and their professional
associations are regaining some of their lost political clout and economic leverage." Other
reasons for the decline include "government subsidization of health care and the
corresponding growth of commercial enterprise, the application of the antitrust laws to the
'learned professions,' and the consumer challenge to medical authority and selfregulation.... Policy makers eschewed centralized authority in favor of market competition
to stem rising costs. Corporate medicine emerged the victor, thanks in no small part to
legislative enactments, court rulings, and the support of government agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission." Id.); Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain
Futureof CompetitionLaw in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 185 (observing
some failures in antitrust enforcement in the health sector); Barbara Martinez, With New
Muscle, Hospitals Squeeze Insurers on Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at Al; Joseph
Weber, The New Power Play in Health Care, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 2002, at 90 (noting how
managed care plans are losing the upper hand in negotiations over price and other issues, as
providers merge and otherwise consolidate for bargaining purposes).
7. Sage & Hammer, supra note 1, at 251-54 (describing the continued weaknesses of
physicians within modem health care systems, as illustrated by, inter alia, (1) the staff
privileges cases, (2) increased pressures that insurers, not physicians, can impose upon
hospitals, (3) the emergence of big businesses in the home health care and durable medical
equipment industries, and (4) the continued market power of large pharmaceutical
companies).
8. Id. at 251 (describing federal enforcement agencies' "heightened awareness of the
realities of health care financing and delivery" in modem health care markets, which
"confound at least three major assumptions that had governed traditional antitrust oversight:
(1) the central role physicians play in controlling medical markets, (2) the classification of
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) marked the possible beginning of a
new era in antitrust and health care on February 19, 2002. It is difficult to
overstate the radical nature of the FTC's break with the conventional
wisdom of the antitrust community: the notion that a physician-controlled
joint venture would be allowed to negotiate jointly and fix prices without
demonstrating any economic integration is completely antithetical to the
essentialist perspective that pervaded antitrust scrutiny of joint ventures
before 1996. 9
In an advisory opinion letter to MedSouth, an IPA in Denver, Colorado,' 0
the FTC offered the first public insights into its "clinical integration"
analysis under the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care (Health Care Statements), promulgated in conjunction with the
Department of Justice Healthcare Task Force in 1996." By approving a
payers as pro-competitive consumer agents, and (3) the belief that price and quality
competition will necessarily work in tandem").
9. As Professor Brodley explains, the now-superseded 1988 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines premised the definition of a "joint venture" as "an integration of operations
between two or more separate firms, in which the following conditions are present: (1) the
enterprise is under the joint control of the parent firms; (2) each parent makes a substantial
contribution to the joint venture; (3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from
its parents; and (4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise capability in terms of
new productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or entry into a new market."
Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1526
(1982). The Antitrust Division, in its prior international guidelines, noted that a "joint
venture is essentially any collaborative effort of firms, short of a merger, with respect to
[research and development], production, distribution, and/or the marketing of products or
services ...that typically achieves integrational efficiencies." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988) § 3.4,
reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,109. The more recent international guidelines
do not attempt to define joint venture or provide substantive analysis. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(1995),

reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13, 132.
10. Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Director Health Care Services &
Products, Federal Trade Commission, to John J. Miles, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, 2002
WL 463290 (F.T.C.) [hearinafter MedSouth Staff Opinion].
11.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &

FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS

OF ANTITRUST

(1996), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,153, § 8(B) (Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS]. A number of

ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE

previous opinions had discussed the requirements for "financial integration" of IPAs under §
8(A)(4). See, e.g., Associates in Neurology, Inc., To Robert C. Norton, August 13, 1998
(IPA network composed of eleven neurologists formed to contract with managed care plans);
Phoenix Medical Network, Inc. To William T. Harvey, May 19, 1998 (physician network of
osteopathic services providers formed to contract with third party payers); Yellowstone
Physicians, L.L.C. To David V. Meany, Esq., May 14, 1997 (multispecialty physician
network joint venture formed to contract with third party payers); Uronet of Louisiana,
L.L.C. To Christopher C. Johnston, January 23, 1996 (IPA network of urologists formed to
contract with managed care plans); Eastern Ohio Physicians Organization, Inc. (EOPO) to
Stephen P. Nash, Esq., September 28, 1995 (multispecialty physician organization
established to contract on behalf of its participating physicians with third party payers);
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plan for the partial integration of physicians' practices through the joint
negotiation of fee-for-service contracts, the FTC opened the door to a form
of competition that has the potential to impose unprecedented competition
along the dimensions of both quality and price within the managed care
industry. 2
The highly fact-specific nature of antitrust litigation and the ill-defined
parameters of the federal authorities' enforcement decisions pose significant
uncertainties to would-be innovators.
These uncertainties must be
recognized and overcome in order to continue the developmental evolution
that could follow in the wake of the MedSouth Staff Opinion. On the one
hand, MedSouth's success may finally allow individual physicians to strike
back at traditional managed care organizations by fixing fee-for-service
prices as ancillary restraints to their larger "clinical integration" plans. 3 On
the other hand, it is far from clear that MedSouth will be able to honor the
promises it made to the FTC, and the enormous logistical, financial, and
capital-intensive obstacles that MedSouth will have to overcome may make
its information technology
(IT)-intensive "virtual IPA" model difficult (or
14
impossible) to replicate.
To analyze both the potential importance and the undeniable difficulty of
the MedSouth "clinical integration" proposal, this article simultaneously
Hematology/Oncology Care Specialists of Western Pennsylvania, P. C. To Stephen P. Nash,
Esq., September 21, 1995 (physician network of hematology/oncology services providers
formed to negotiate with third-party payers); Otolaryngology Specialty Providers of Georgia,
To Thomas W. Rhodes, Esq., August 15, 1995 (physician network of otolaryngology
services providers formed to facilitate individual contracts among network members and
payers); Northwestern Nevada Orthopaedic Surgery Alliance, To Jacqueline C. Cox, July 11
& 27, 1995 (physician network of orthopedic services providers formed to facilitate
individual contracts among network members and payers); Oakland Physician Network,
L.L.C. To John A. Cook, Esq., March 28, 1995 (physician network joint venture composed
of primary care physicians formed to market primary and specialty physician services to
health benefit plans); Rocky Mountain Cardiovascular Affiliates, To Neil E. Ayervais, Esq.,
September 23, 1994 (limited liability company composed of physician cardiovascular
services practices formed to negotiate and contract with third party payers); South East
Managed Care Organization-Jackson Medical Cooperative, To George Q. Evans, Esq., July
5, 1994 (physician network joint venture between physician directed managed care
organization and group of physician providers).
12. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2624 (2001)
("Physician organizations are retreating from global capitation to partial capitation, case
rates, or fee-for-service.").
13. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *7.
14. MedSouth has been collaborating with an IT venture capital firm to implement a
"virtual infrastructure" for its IPA. Their IT-intensive program has two parts: "(1) a webbased electronic clinical data record system that will permit MedSouth physicians to access
and share clinical information relating to their patients; and (2) the adoption and
implementation of clinical practice guidelines and performance goals relating to the quality
and appropriate use of services provided by MedSouth physicians." MedSouth Staff
Opinion, supra note 10, at*3.
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proceeds along two tracks. From a macro perspective, I attempt to
reconcile the FTC's treatment of MedSouth against the backdrop of the
antitrust principles at work in the health care industry. However, the
skeletal sketch of the "virtual IPA" model presented in the MedSouth Staff
Opinion can be effectuated only when coupled with numerous micro-level
assumptions about the IPA's internal operations. Thus, each of the macrolevel conclusions and policy recommendations presented below must be
accompanied by a healthy dose of skepticism with respect to the daunting
project MedSouth has made for itself.
Part II of this paper analyzes the FTC's treatment of MedSouth's EPA
proposal under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act1 5 and
assesses the costs and benefits of IPAs as joint ventures under the Health
Care Statements. I evaluate the implications of MedSouth's integration
proposal and argue that the FTC's tentative approval is only the first of
many antitrust hurdles that physician-centered and technology-driven IPAs
must overcome. Part III then places MedSouth within the larger antitrust
context by analyzing MedSouth's potential exposure to private enforcement
actions under either the Sherman Act 16 or the Clayton Antitrust Act. 17 After
tracing the jurisprudential evolution of the rule-of-reason approach to
federal antitrust enforcement, 18 Part IV then proposes a formalized model
for the ex ante assessment of joint ventures and applies the model to
MedSouth.
In conclusion, I argue that the MedSouth Staff Opinion is a welcome
statement of the FTC's philosophical principles. Important questions
remain unanswered, however, regarding the initiation, resolution, and
implications of antitrust litigation related to physicians' joint ventures. The
potential ramifications of MedSouth's plans are both exciting and
frightening: the possibility of its success is matched by a countervailing
possibility of its failure. Insofar as the MedSouth project encourages the
reckless expenditure of venture capital on difficult (or impossible) "clinical
15.

15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).

16. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2000).
17. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44.
18. Note that this paper considers only the federal antitrust laws. The MedSouth IPA is,
of course, subject to Colorado's state antitrust laws and regulations, as well. See, e.g.,
Nicholas v. N. Colo. Med. Ctr., 902 P.2d 462 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the findings
and conclusions of the Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners' Committee on Anticompetitive Conduct (CAC), which held defendant's action in restricting plaintiff's staff
privileges was the result of unreasonable anti-competitive conduct under the Colorado
Unfair Trade Practices Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-2-101 et seq.); Ryals v. St. Mary-Corwin
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 10 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2000) (holding that "based on the plain language of the
Colorado Professional Review Act (CPRA) [Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-36.5-101 to -106] and
the statutory scheme as a whole, that the CAC has jurisdiction only over those claims of anticompetitive conduct that arise out of professional review connittee activity").
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integration" plans elsewhere, the FTC's opinion letter may ultimately prove
to be counterproductive to the development of competitive alternatives to
traditional managed care organizations. The prospect of being held liable
for treble damages according to the whims of an ambiguous and uncertain
antitrust regime is an enormous disincentive for innovation. The exposure
to potential liability seems particularly acute when it is premised on the
failure of a high-risk business plan like MedSouth's. Federal authoritiesin the halls of both courts and bureaucracies-have begun to recognize the
deleterious effects of ad hoc antitrust policies that exclude non-price
variables in their competitive calculi.' 9 A formal model that utilizes both
price and non-price factors (i.e., price and quality) to reduce investors'
uncertainty and assuage providers' antitrust concerns is an essential
cornerstone for the modern health care industry, which is increasingly
driven by capital-intensive development strategies. By providing clear and
predictable antitrust principles, policymakers could remove much of the
"adventure" from joint ventures. Using MedSouth as a vehicle for analysis,
this paper (in general) and the model presented in Part IV (in particular)
attempt to provide answers for some of the insuperable horizontal pricefixing and price-coordination constraints that have impeded the
development of IPAs as bona fide competitors within the managed care
industry.
II.

MEDSOUTH AS AN

IPA JOINT (AD)VENTURE

The FTC first announced its drastic change of course in the regulation of
physician-controlled joint ventures in 1996.20 Prior enforcement principles
19. See John J. Miles, Joint Venture Analysis and Provider-ControlledHealth Care
Networks, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 128 & n.6 (1997) (discussing then-FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofsky's approach to balancing the anti- and pro-competitive effects of physiciancontrolled networks and joint ventures: "[o]ne interpretation is a purpose to establish new
groups of physicians that can more effectively compete against other forms of health care
delivery and financing, such as health maintenance organizations, by increasing the
efficiency with which services are delivered and providing a product more attractive than the
individual physicians themselves could provide. Another interpretation, however, is a
purpose to aggregate the physicians' market power as sellers to offset the countervailing
power that the physicians believe large managed care plans can exercise as purchasers of
physician services. The second interpretation, of course, may conflict with the goals of the
antitrust laws.").
20. The Health Care Statements define a joint venture network as an independent
practice association (IPA), a preferred provider organization (PPO), or a substantively
equivalent arrangement that is designed to market the services of the participating physicians
to health plans. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supranote 11, § 8. When physicians participate
in networks, they typically continue to compete with each other for patients who are not
enrolled in the network. This distinguishes the network from a fully integrated group
practice, where the physicians are partners, shareholders, or employees, and do not compete
with each other. Id. at § 8, n.21.
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in place at the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) posed significant
antitrust obstacles to the formation of joint venture health care networks.2 1
Although the MedSouth Staff Opinion helpfully elucidates the FTC's
thinking with respect to collaboration between physicians in today's health
care markets, many open questions continue to plague the FTC's analysis.22
The resultant uncertainty that surrounds federal antitrust policy for joint
ventures extends beyond the FTC and threatens to stymie innovative
strategies for cutting costs and improving quality in the modem health care
marketplace.
A. The MedSouth IPA
The MedSouth IPA includes about 430 doctors who practice in the fields
of primary care and forty specialties and sub-specialties.23 The MedSouth
physicians coordinate activities by (1) sharing clinical information; (2)
coordinating treatment, particularly the interface between primary care
doctors and specialists; (3) developing practice protocols; and (4)
monitoring the compliance of individuals in the group.24 MedSouth hopes
its integration will improve patient outcomes, decrease use of physician
resources and provide the IPA with a "competitive advantage" over other
practices in the area.
Prices for treatment will be collectively negotiated with payers, but
doctors will bill individually and directly on a fee-for-service basis.
MedSouth will not be "financially integrated"; that is, the IPA will not
negotiate capitated contracts or share profits of a joint enterprise. 26 Instead,
MedSouth will rely solely on the pro-competitive effects of "clinical27
integration" measures to justify its ancillary price-fixing agreements;
21. For an overview of the ambiguities in the agencies' enforcement principles before
1996, see generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation:A
New Antitrust Standardfor Joint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 871, 878 (1994)
[hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling Cooperation];Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule
of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust Standardfor Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 12 (1991) [hereinafter Piraino, Beyond Per se]; Robert Pitofsky, A Frameworkfor
Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1605 (1986); James T. Halverson,
The Future of HorizontalRestraintsAnalysis, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 33 (1988).
22. Thomas B. Leary, The Antitrust Implications of "ClinicalIntegration": An Analysis
of FTC Staff's Advisory Opinion to MedSouth, 47 ST. Louis L.J. 223, 230-31 (2003).
23. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *2.
24. Id.at *34.
25. Id.at *2-3.
26. Id.at *2.
27. See Pitofsky, supra note 21, at 1611 (noting that "agreements that would appear to
be illegal or close to the line of illegality if viewed in isolation may be legal if they truly
contribute (that i[s], are "ancillary") to the organization or further the purpose of the joint
venture, and are no broader in scope than necessary"). Professor Hovenkamp explains that to
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nevertheless, the venture will be non-exclusive, and members can contract
individually with payers who do not choose to negotiate with the group."
B. Joint Ventures Under the FTC Act
In response to MedSouth's request for an advisory opinion, the FTC
concluded that a "per se analysis would not be appropriate in evaluating
MedSouth's proposed course of conduct., 29 The rationale for this
conclusion was that the proposed plan "appears to involve partial
integration among MedSouth physicians that has the potential to increase
the quality and reduce the cost of medical care., 30 In addition, the staff
opined that the proposed "joint contracting appears to be sufficiently related
to, and reasonably necessary for, the achievement of the potential benefits
to be regarded as ancillary to the operation of the venture."3 1
Analysis under section 5 of the FTC Act, like analysis under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, proceeds through a two-step process. First, the FTC
determines whether the proposed integration plan should be treated as per
32
se illegal because it is "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.
Almost all inquiries proceed to the second step of the FTC's analysis under
the rule-of-reason. 33 In determining whether to apply per se illegality, as
well as in applying the rule-of-reason analysis, "the inquiry is confined to a
consideration of impact on competitive conditions. 3 4 In contrast to the rule

determine whether a restraint is ancillary, "consider (1) whether the restraint is necessary to
make the joint venture function, (2) whether the restraint is broader than it need be to
accomplish its purpose, and (3) whether the threat to competition is significant." HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §

5.2(b)(4), at 191 (1994).
28. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *5.
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id. at*1.
31. Id.
32. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Several categories of conduct
have been labeled per se illegal, including (1) price-fixing, both vertical and horizontal; (2)
tying arrangements where a seller permits a buyer to purchase a desired item (the tying
product) over which the seller has market power only if the buyer also agrees to purchase a
second item (the tied product) from the seller; (3) group boycotts or concerted refusals to
deal; and (4) horizontal market divisions. Id.; see generally 2 JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI ET
AL., ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 6.02[l] (1984).
33. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)
[hereinafter NSPE]. Easterbrook has criticized this formulation of the rule of reason as
"empty." Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 12 (1984). He
argues that the definition of the rule of reason currently employed by the courts is too vague
to offer useful guidance to judges and suggests as an alternative the use by courts of a series
of presumptions, based on economic theory, to aid in deciding whether conduct is "anticompetitive." Id. at 14-39.
34. NSPE, 435 U.S. at 690.
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of reason, there is no defense to per se illegality once an agreement is
demonstrated. 35 Price-fixing agreements, whether to raise, depress, fix, or
stabilize a commodity's price, are per se illegal regardless of their anticompetitive effects (or lack thereof).36
Because the consequences are severely different between per se
treatment and the rule-of-reason, and because choosing between them
necessarily requires applying the latter, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has suggested scrapping the formalities of the "per se" charade
altogether.37 Nevertheless, the FTC began its MedSouth inquiry by noting
that per se treatment of its integration plan was inappropriate because joint
negotiation of fee-for-service contracts and price-fixing are permissible, so
long as the physician network is sufficiently clinically integrated.38
Determining whether MedSouth's plans to share patient data and employ
evidence-based practice guidelines and clinical protocols are sufficient to
make the IPA "clinically integrated" requires a full-blown rule-of-reason
analysis. 39 And in the context of an opinion letter, the FTC's ex ante
assessment remains highly tentative.
1. Benefits
While the MedSouth Staff Opinion refers only generically to the
"potential efficiencies" of its proposed IPA structure, any antitrust
enforcement action is certain to involve a highly specified accounting of the
costs and benefits of the joint venture at issue. Therefore, before discussing
the FTC's treatment of MedSouth in particular, it might be helpful to
analyze the strengths and weaknesses ofjoint ventures in general.
There are at least five potentially significant benefits of joint ventures.4 °
First, joint ventures may offer significant economies of scale in product

35.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978).

36. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1970).
37. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
38. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 8(A)(4) n.33.
39. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *6.
40. Miles has identified several more than five potential benefits. See Miles, supra note
19, at 134-35 (noting that joint venture "networks can do much more than merely reduce
transaction costs. Through financial risk sharing, strong and effective utilization review,
development and implementation of practice parameters, and case management, they can
reduce unnecessary utilization and thus reduce costs. Some of these programs, as well as
credentialing, selective contracting, and quality assurance programs, can increase quality
without increasing costs or resource use. Thus, networks do have the potential to generate
the kinds of benefits that justify their being labeled and analyzed as joint ventures for
antitrust analytical purposes.").
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development, production, and distribution. 4 1 For example, joint ventures
among firms pursuing similar research agendas can help participants
minimize or eliminate duplication.42 They can also enable participants to
more efficiently advertise and market their products.43 Second, joint
ventures can potentially foster reductions in transaction costs.4 4 For
example, an Internet business-to-business exchange can eliminate a series
of exchanged voice mails, faxes, purchase orders and invoices, thus shaving
hundreds of dollars off the cost of a transaction.45
Third, joint ventures can create synergies by pooling and using
complementary resources-including such diverse resources as patents,
know-how, production facilities, and even human expertise and ingenuityto create a whole greater than the sum of its parts.4 6 A firm with
manufacturing expertise, for example, might share its expertise with a firm
possessing marketing expertise to manufacture and bring a product to
market.47 Fourth, joint ventures can also solve "hold up" problems.4 8 In
some fields, particularly those that involve cutting edge technology or
complex issues of standardization, a new product may infringe on the
patents of many different firms. The producer of such a product must get
41. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); Joseph
Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the
Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 939 (1993); Pitofsky, supra note 21, at
1619-20.
42. See Richard W. Pogue, Antitrust Considerations in Forming a Joint Venture, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 926-27 (1985); see also Katherine L. Race, The Future ofDigital Movie
Distribution on the Internet: Antitrust Concerns with the Movielink and Movies.corn
Proposals,29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 89, 119-20 (2003).
43. Pitofsky, supra note 21, at 1605; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A ProposedAntitrust
Approach to CollaborationsAmong Competitors,86 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1171 (2001).
44. HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 5.2(c), at 192; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1979) [hereinafter BM]; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 235-39 (1918).
45.

FTC, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B

ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES, Part II, at 3 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/1 0/b2breport.pdf
46. Pitofsky, supra note 21, at 1616-18; Piraino, Reconciling Cooperation, supra note
21, at 886-89; Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation:
Implicationsfor Competition andAntitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 78 (1990).
47. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (ratifying the proposed
production joint venture between General Motors and Toyota).
48.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, Antitrust Guidelines for the

Licensing ofIntellectual Property(1995), reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T13, 132, §
5.5; see also Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, Economics Department,
University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper E01-301, at 25 (May 1, 2001); David A.
Balto, StandardSetting in a Network Economy, Address Before Cutting Edge Antitrust Law
Seminars International (Feb. 17, 2000),
available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
standardsetting.htm.
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permission from each patent holder to produce that product. Unfortunately,
each patent holder then has the incentive to "hold up" for the biggest share
of the producer's expected surplus, impeding the development of new
products. A joint venture can create efficiencies by pooling together the
diverse array of patents and licensing them together in a single bundle.49
Fifth, and finally, joint ventures can also perform important insurance
functions by allowing their participants to reduce large risks to
commercially acceptable levels.5 ° In the most common examples, insurance
and lending consortia, underwriting syndicates, and exploration joint
ventures quite literally spread risk among their participants. 5'
2. Structural Flaws
In addition to the anti-competitive concerns that serve as the focus of
traditional legal inquiries under the antitrust laws, it is important to note that
the efficiencies offered by joint ventures are likely to be impeded by at least
two countervailing forces of inefficiency that are endemic to the joint
venture model.
First, joint ventures imperfectly align the incentives of
their participants insofar as participants in a joint venture bear only a
portion of the costs of the joint venture and gain only a portion of its
benefits. As a result, participants have an incentive to refrain from doing
49. See Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes
and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 735, 782-83 (2000); Alfred Hill, The Sale of ControllingShares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986
(1957).
50. Scott D. Danzis, Revising the Revised Guidelines: Incentives, Clinically Integrated
Physician Networks, and the Antitrust Laws, 87 VA. L. REv. 531, 553 (2001); E. Douglas
Baldridge, Jr., Physicians Versus Managed Care: Is It Time for Physician Unions? 28 N.
Ky. L. REV. 65, 73 (2000).
51. See also United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 689-91, 733-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (upholding securities underwriting syndicates).
52. These problems have been explored extensively in the economics literature, and
globalization has made them increasingly important in recent years. See Bettina Buchel,
Joint Venture Development: Driving Forces Towards Equilibrium, 37 J. WORLD Bus. 199207 (2002); Jean-Francois Hennart & Ming Zeng, Cross-CulturalDifferences and Joint
Venture Longevity, 33 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 699-716 (2002); Ping Lin & Kamal Saggi, UnderProvision of Inputs in Joint Ventures with Market Power, 54 BULL. ECON. RESEARCH 189-96
(2002); Maria R. Battaggion & Paolo G. Garella, Joint Venture for a New Product and
Antitrust Exemptions, 40 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 247-62 (2001); Yannis Katsoulacos &

David Ulph, Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures, 46 J.
IND. ECON. 333-57 (1998).
53. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 161 & n.357 (2002); Edward Correia, Joint
Ventures: Issues in Enforcement Policy, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 737, 763 (1998) (asserting that
open access rules "undermine the incentive to collaborate in the first place," encourage firms
not to join a risky research effort until it is successful, and prevent rival groups from forming
competing ventures).
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things that would benefit the joint venture as a whole, while putting the
joint venture's property to uses that benefit themselves but harm the joint
venture as a whole.54 Second, because participants retain their independent
identities, joint ventures are inherently more cumbersome than single
firms.55 Decisions must be reached through negotiation and consensus
rather than edict.
C. Application of the Health CareStatements
After it decides that a per se condemnation of an integration proposal is
inappropriate, the FTC's rule-of-reason analysis of physician-controlled
joint ventures proceeds according to section 8 of the 1996 Health Care
Statements. 6 While the antitrust laws have prohibited any form of
horizontal price-fixing since at least 1926, 57 the Health Care Statements
carve out two novel "safety zone" exceptions that empower physicians to
coordinate their fee-for-service contracting efforts in ways that have long
been deemed per se illegal. First, they allow networks that share
"substantial financial risk" to contract with a self-funded employer on a feefor-service basis and to be eligible for a reward if it meets budgetary goals.
A network is then capable of realizing many of the benefits of full-risk or
global capitation; 58 since it is not subject to downside risk, it need not
acquire an insurance license. Second, the Health Care Statements also
allow "clinically integrated" fee-for-service networks to enjoy the same
price coordination benefits enjoyed by financially integrated networks,
although the former need not share any risk. Both financially integrated
and clinically integrated networks are evaluated under the rule-of-reason
analysis because the efficiencies of the physicians' cooperative activity may
benefit consumers more than the detriments caused by reduced competition.
A group of independent physicians which does nothing more than agree

54. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 212-13
(D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Rothery Storage] (discussing this problem and explaining that
joint ventures should be afforded some flexibility in overcoming it).
55. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521,
1529 (1982).
56. Before the promulgation of the Health Care Statements, both the DOJ and the FTC
had chosen to remain silent about the proper determinants of a rule-of-reason analysis. See
FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS § 1, at 2 n.5, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/jointindex.htm;
FTC, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES, Part III, at 16-23, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/
index.htm#26.
57. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1926).
58. Peter R. Kongstvedt, M.D., Refining Reimbursement Methods for Physician
Services, in THE CAPITATION SOURCEBOOK 96, 107, 113 (Peter Boland ed., 1996).
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to provide services pursuant to a discounted fee schedule is considered to be
unintegrated.5 9 Such an agreement can create efficiencies by reducing
transaction costs for payers who want a network of physicians willing to
discount fees because the payer need not approach and negotiate with each
physician individually. However, the agencies do not believe that these
efficiencies are substantial enough to justify the potential adverse effects on
competition of the fee agreement among the physicians. 60 The agencies are
concerned that the physicians will attempt to negotiate fees that are higher
than would prevail in free competition, and then will back up those
negotiations with a threat of boycott. Therefore, these arrangements among
unintegrated physicians are per se illegal and do not qualify for rule-ofreason analysis.6 1
1. The Safety Zones
For a network to be in the safety zone, its members must share
substantial financial risk, which the agencies regard as a form of financial
integration. The physicians may not account for more than twenty percent
of any specialty in the market if the network is exclusive, 62 and no more
than thirty percent of the market if nonexclusive. Substantial financial risk
is created through arrangements whereby the venture assumes capitation,63
645
receives a percentage of the premium,64 uses
global fees,65 or uses
59. Miles, supra note 19, at 134-35; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
60. For example, the DOJ has said: "An agreement among competitors to set a minimum
price, for example, would not be saved from per se condemnation simply because the
defendants claimed that the agreement eliminated the transaction costs that consumers would
otherwise incur in searching out the lowest price." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div.,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988), reprintedin

4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

13,109.10, at 20,594 (Apr. 11, 1995). The 1988 version of these

guidelines was superseded by the ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995), reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,107 (Apr.

11, 1995). The 1995 revision does not address the issue of efficiencies; the 1988 version is
still an accurate view of the DOJ on this subject.
61. See generally HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 9(C) & n.65; see also
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 102 at 285-86 ("It...

seems clear enough, in the absence of any claim of integration efficiencies of the kind which
might be obtained where two or more competitors agree to hire a joint sales or service agent,
that if the [sellers] negotiate concertedly with [buyers] over the price charged by the [sellers]
on sales to the [buyers], the [sellers] would be violating the per se rule against concerted
action by competitors affecting price.").
62. HEALTH CAPE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, §§ 8(A)(1) & (2).
63. Id. § 8(A)(4)(1) & n.30.
64. Id. § 8(A)(4)(2).
65. Id. § 8(A)(4)(4) & n.32 (Global fees involve an "agreement by the venture to
provide a complex or extended course of treatment that requires the substantial coordination
of care by physicians in different specialties offering a complementary mix of services, for a
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significant financial incentives to achieve specified cost containment goals.
This includes substantial fee withholds 66 as well as penalties or rewards
based on whether the network meets cost or utilization goals. The Health
Care Statements operate on the premise that if the joint venture is
financially integrated, it is safe to assume that market forces will exercise
adequate discipline against any organization that fails to generate actual
efficiencies.
The twenty and thirty percent safety zones operate as rebuttable
presumptions against the legality of the joint venture. The FTC will allow a
network to exceed the safety zones under one of two sets of circumstances.
First, the FTC will condone a joint venture that exceeds the relevant
specialty concentration limits if the network is comprised of physicians who
are sharing substantial financial risk while generating significant
efficiencies in the form of reduced costs and higher quality. The FTC has
previously explored the financial exception to the safety zones.67 In
contrast, MedSouth is the first opportunity the FTC has seized to explain
the other exception to the market concentration limits: clinical integration.68
2. Clinically Integrated
The FTC will also exempt from its safety zones networks that are not
engaged in substantial risk sharing, but that use techniques to reduce costs
and enhance quality that are used by risk-assuming networks. 69 For
example, a network in a competitive market may want to market itself to
payors who prefer to deal on a fee-for-service basis, such as preferred
provider organizations and self-insured employers, and may want to get 7a0
competitive edge by using techniques to lower cost and improve quality.
fixed, predetermined payment, where the costs of that course of treatment for any individual
patient can vary greatly due to the individual patient's condition, the choice, complexity, or
length of treatment, or other factors.").
66. Id § 8(A)(4)(3)(a) (Fee-withhold arrangements involve "withholding from all
physician participants in the network a substantial amount of the compensation due to them,
with distribution of that amount to the physician participants based on group performance in
meeting the cost-containment goals of the network as a whole.").

67.

See HEALTH

CARE STATEMENTS,

supra note 11, § 8 n.24.

68. Leary, supra note 22, at 223.
69. See MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10.
70. It is important to note the magnitude of the FTC's revisions to the 1996 Health Care
Statements. The pre-1996 Enforcement Statements did not state clearly that non-financially
integrated organizations could justify rule-of-reason treatment, and as a result, some
commentators thought financial integration was the sine qua non of the ancillary restraint
justification. See Comments of the American Medical Association on the Need for Revisions
to the Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Heath Care
and Antitrust of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
at 33-34 (June 21, 1996) ("the only forms of economic integration that [are] recognized for
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Statement Eight recognizes that if a network uses some or all of these
techniques, it has a plausible argument that it is generating efficiencies and
therefore qualifies for a rule-of-reason analysis. 71 The agencies will
evaluate the network to determine if the efficiencies generated by the
techniques outweigh any adverse effect on competition. The Statements
consider a network to be "clinically integrated" if it is
implementing an active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify
practice patterns by the network's physician participants and create a high
degree of interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to
control costs and ensure quality. This program may include: (1)
establishing mechanisms to monitor and control utilization of health care
services that are designed to control costs and assure quality of care; (2)
selectively choosing network physicians who are likely to further these
efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant investment of capital, both
monetary and human, in the necessary
infrastructure and capability to
72
realize the claimed efficiencies.
This description appears to condemn networks that do no more than
achieve "transactional efficiencies" such as arranging for broad geographic
and specialty coverage at discounted prices.73 Transactional efficiencies
reduce costs, but are insufficient to affect the nature and overall value of the
health care services delivered by the network.74 Moreover, the addition of
administrative services (such as claims payment) is unlikely to generate
sufficient efficiencies to outweigh the anti-competitive harms posed by
price-fixing. 75 Networks that rely on transactional efficiencies must use the
messenger model to arrive at price arrangements with payers.76 It is equally
physician joint ventures are the assumption of insurance risk"). And the AMA's pre-1996
reading of the Enforcement Statements was perfectly reasonable, insofar as Maricopacan be
read as requiring some degree of integration into a single entity before its "new product" test
could be met. See Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (suggesting that
where the venture does not sell a "different product," the "joint venture ... is regarded as a
single firm").
71. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 8(B)(1) n.36 ("The Agencies' analysis
will focus on the efficiencies likely to be produced by the venture, and the relationship of
any price agreements to the achievement of those efficiencies, rather than on whether the
venture creates a product that can be labeled 'new' or 'different."').
72. Id.§ 8(A)(4).
73. Cf BMI, 441 U.S. at 23 (1979) ("Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements
are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on
price is necessary to market the product at all.").
74. Id.at 19.
75. Miles, supra note 19, at 146.
76. Messenger arrangements, by which a network "messenger" receives contract offers
from third-party payers and passes them on to network participants who decide individually
whether to contract with the payer (thus avoiding a horizontal price-fixing agreement), are
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unlikely that the addition of physician credentialing justifies a price-fixing
restraint, insofar as merely establishing the qualifications of physicians does
not do enough to affect the overall value of the medical care delivered.
Similarly, an IPA could institute credentialing practices without fixing
prices.7 7
A network that implements transactional and administrative efficiencies,
physician credentialing, utilization review, and/or preauthorization of
hospital admissions moves into a gray area.7 8 Such a network is likely to be
79
too similar to the network found to be per se illegal in iMaricopa.
Statement Eight seems to require that a "clinically integrated" IPA must
monitor individual physicians in such a way as to change their practice
By focusing on the necessity of
patterns to achieve efficiencies. 80
"mechanisms to monitor and control utilization" of services, while
minimizing costs and also assuring quality of care, the Health Care
discussed in the HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 9(C). See also Robert W.
McCann, Theory and Reality in the Revised DOJ-FTCEnforcement Guidelinesfor Provider
Networks, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 239, 246-51 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1997); cf BMl,
441 U.S. at 5, 20 ("[I]t was impossible for the many individual copyright owners to negotiate
with and license users and to detect unauthorized uses"; rather, "[a] middleman with a
blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual
impossibility, were to be avoided.").
77. Miles, supra note 19, at 149 ("It would seem, for example, that a network easily
could institute effective utilization review, quality assurance, and credentialing programs that
would generate the network's efficiencies without the members agreeing on the prices that
they would charge through the network.").
78. McCann, supra note 76, at 246 ("From the standpoint of traditional antitrust law, it
is difficult to understand how the Agencies reached the conclusion that integration through
utilization management would legitimize joint pricing and contract negotiation. Traditional
joint venture analysis holds that embedded agreements (e.g., on price) must be necessary to
the achievement of the productive efficiencies of the venture. Providers who come together
to perform UM/QA [utilization management/quality assurance] clearly need to engage in
some forms of joint activity, such as sharing utilization and cost data. While the development
of a common fee schedule may be convenient in terms of marketing a UM/QA network, it is
far from clear that joint pricing is an essential attribute of a functional UM/QA
organization.").
79. Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982). The defendant
medical society in Maricopaperformed three functions. First, it set a schedule of maximum
fees that participating physicians agreed to accept as payment in full for services performed
for patients insured under plans approved by the foundation. Second, defendant medical
society reviewed the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatment provided. Third,
acting in its capacity as an "insurance administrator," defendant medical society drew checks
on insurance company accounts to pay doctors for services performed for covered patients.
Id. at 339-40.
80. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 8(B)(1) ("Such integration can be
evidenced by the network implementing an active and ongoing program to evaluate and
modify practicepatterns by the network's physician participants and create a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality."
(emphasis added)).
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Statements are meant to ensure that the joint venture's price restraints are
logically connected to (and at least partially necessary for) the network's
81
proposed integration plans.
The adoption of practice guidelines, in addition to implementing
administrative efficiencies, physician credentialing, and utilization review
procedures, may move the joint venture out of Maricopa's shadow and into
the solid ground of a rule-of-reason analysis. However, to generate
efficiencies, the physicians in the network must actually apply the practice
guidelines, 8 2 which should be consistent with the protocols applied through
the utilization review process. 83 The use of practice guidelines may help
qualify a network for a rule-of-reason analysis because it reflects an effort
to have all of the network physicians follow a best practice.84 This use,
coupled with a utilization review process targeted at criteria that are
consistent with the guidelines, shows that the network is clearly
coordinating the care of the physicians to achieve higher quality and/or
lower costs, thereby attempting to distinguish itself from competitors by

81. Id. § 8(B). See SULLIVAN, supra note 61, § 77, at 208 (noting that "the price
restraint must arise inevitably from the integration .... If the integration is to be permitted at
all, the consequent reduction in price competition must be tolerated."); see also id at 206
("the elimination of price competition ... must result directly from the partial integration").
82. On the topic of resistance by individual physicians to implementing practice
guidelines in their routine diagnostic and therapeutic activities, see generally, Linda
Gundersen, The Effect of Clinical PracticeGuidelines on Variations in Care, 133 ANNALS
INTERN. MED. 317 (2000); Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don't PhysiciansFollow Clinical
Practice Guidelines? A Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999); Otto
Costantini et al., Attitudes of Faculty, Housestaff, and Medical Students Toward Clinical
PracticeGuidelines, 74 ACAD. MED. 1138 (1999) (citing the need for considerable education
and involvement at all levels for practice guidelines to be successfully implemented and
understood); Jeoffrey K. Stross, Guidelines Have Their Limits, 131 ANNALS INTERN. MED.
304 (1999); John Inouye et al., Physicians' Changing Attitudes Toward Guidelines, 13 J.
GEN. INTERN. MED. 324 (1998). But see David R. Gifford et al., Improving Adherence to
Dementia Guidelines through Education and Opinion Leaders, 131 ANNALS INTERN. MED.
237 (1999) (demonstrating ways to improve physician adherence to dementia guidelines);
Deborah Cook & Mita Giacomini, The Trials and Tribulations of Clinical Practice
Guidelines, 281 JAMA 1950 (1998) (suggesting that guidelines are most likely to be
implemented in practice if they have been adapted to the local environment); Claudia A.
Steiner et al., The Review Process Used by U.S. Health Care Plans to EvaluateNew Medical
Technology for Coverage, 11 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 294 (1996) (health plan medical
directors ranked practice guidelines highly as a source of information used in their decisionmaking processes).
83. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standardsof Care, 29 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 323, 329 (2001) (attempting to define "the liability of a sponsoring provider
or health plan for selecting a medical standard of care and incorporating it into a
computerized patient records system of an integrated delivery system for use in clinical care
and utilization review.").
84. See Wendy L. Krasner & Thomas J. Walsh, The Regulation ofPhysician Incentives,
in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 179, 182-93.
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developing and applying its own concepts about how to deliver a good
value to patients. But implementing and enforcing the combination of
practice guidelines and utilization review measures poses practical
difficulties-not the least of which is the new realm of liability standards to
which the network exposes itself by integrating its members into a common
guideline regime. 85
The Health Care Statements offer only one example of a network that
meets the agencies' "clinical integration" test: the hypothetical
"Charlestown IPA.''86 This network maintained systems to establish quality
goals and monitor appropriate utilization of services by network
participants. It regularly evaluated both the physicians' performance
(individually) and the network's performance (collectively).
Where
necessary, the network acted to modify physicians' practices based on those
evaluations.
It also engaged in case management, preauthorization,
concurrent and retrospective review of inpatient stays, developed practice
standards and protocols to govern treatment and utilization of services, and
planned to actively review the care rendered by each physician in light of
these standards and protocols. 87 The hypothetical network was organized
85. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice
Standardof Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 821, 821 (2002) (arguing "[t]he experience of attempting to integrate clinical practice
guidelines into malpractice litigation suggests that practical and conceptual problems
involved in merging the cultures of medicine, science, and law should not be
underestimated."); Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More
Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 31-33 (2001); Sam A. McKonkey, Simplifying the Law
in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice Guidelines as the Standardof Care in Medical
MalpracticeLitigation, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 491 (1995); Lori Rinella, Comment, The Use of
Medical Malpractice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation-Should Practice
Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 337 (1995); Clark C.
Havighurst, PracticeGuidelines as Legal Standards Governing PhysicianLiability, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (1991); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The
Courts Confront Clinical PracticeGuidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 327, 337-39
(2001) (arguing that a clinical practice guideline could be admitted into evidence for the
purpose of proving (a) customary practice, (b) a "respectable minority" approach to the
clinical situation, (c) "reasonable prudence," (d) "acceptable practice," or (e) the legal
standard of care (directly, without going through any intermediate steps). Other
commentators disagree and insist clinical guidelines offer little probative value; see Cynthia
D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, Proofand Policyfrom Medical Research Evidence, 26 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 249, 260 (2001) (attempting to draw a distinction between "a
guideline, which is a recommendation for best practices, [and] standards [which] are
practices that are medically necessary and services that any practitioner under any
circumstance would be required to render"); Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice
Guidelines: Should They Constitute Conclusive Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 10
HEALTH MATRIX 67, 74-78 (2000) (opposing the conclusive use of practice guidelines to
establish the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation).
86. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 8(C)(1).
87. Id.
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around a core of primary care physicians and included specialists who were
selected based on their established referral relationships with the primary
care physicians as well as their willingness to cooperate with the goals of
the network and the need to provide convenient services to beneficiaries.
Network physicians who failed to adhere to the network's standards and
protocols were subject to remedial action, including expulsion.
D. Conclusion
Given the specifics of the MedSouth proposal and the background
information provided by the Health Care Statements, I conclude this part of
the essay by offering a critical assessment of the FTC's IPA-joint venture
analysis. I argue that the FTC's treatment of MedSouth may ultimately
prove to be counterproductive insofar as it invites would-be innovators to
expose their business plans to legal risk without sufficient guidance for
avoiding antitrust condemnation. In its attempts to regulate a health care
industry facing continued pressures for horizontal integration and cost
containment, the FTC has heretofore failed to address the risky antitrust
"adventures" inherent in joint ventures.
With only a single illustration of a clinically integrated joint venture
from the Health Care Statements to supplement our understanding of the
FTC's treatment of MedSouth, it seems that the Commission's tentative
approval of the "virtual IPA" model was driven in large part by the
agency's faith in MedSouth's ability to incorporate and consistently
implement a common set of clinical guidelines. Unfortunately, the FTC's
faith may well have been misplaced.
MedSouth has promised to
promulgate 100 to 150 clinical guidelines, only 48 of which were even
under development at the time of the Staff Opinion.88 Moreover, even if
MedSouth successfully imposes a full panoply of guidelines, it will be
difficult or impossible to monitor and ensure physicians' compliance unless
the guidelines are fully hardwired into the common electronic medical
record-all of which will require enormous investments of time and money.
The literature is replete with examples of providers' recalcitrance in the
face of mandatory clinical guidelines.89
With enormous up-front fixed costs staring them in the face, MedSouth
will have equally enormous incentives to do as little as possible and to
integrate itself clinically only to the minimum extent necessary so that its
price-fixing practices will not be deemed per se illegal. 90 If MedSouth is
88.
89.
90.
(1996)

MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *4.
See sources cited supra note 82.
See Thomas F. Greaney, Much Ado About Networks, 29 J. HEALTH L. 307, 309
("Less clear, of course, is how much clinical integration is required. This is likely to
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motivated by nothing more than physicians' collective desires to aggregate
and exercise their market power vis-A-vis competing managed care plans,91
and if MedSouth focuses on the "how much (or little) can we get away
with" question, then the FTC's "clinical integration" experiment clearly
will have failed. On the other hand, if MedSouth's participants are
motivated by the efficiencies (notwithstanding Maricopa)92 that network
pricing agreements can generate, and if the IPA has sufficient venture
capital support for deploying its IT infrastructure, then the FTC's
experiment may succeed. Regardless of the eventual outcome, however, it
is unclear whether the FTC approached MedSouth's proposed integration
with a sufficient degree of skepticism relative to the magnitude of the
challenges facing the nascent IPA.93
Additionally, the FTC's conclusions with respect to MedSouth's
"clinical integration" seem to be paradoxical. On the one hand, the FTC
seems concerned that MedSouth will have some significant market powers
that pose potentially anti-competitive concerns; 94 on the other hand, the
be a point of contention and debate in the coming years. It is no secret that many networks
are formed primarily for the purpose of achieving leverage in the market and only
incidentally for realizing whatever efficiencies might be possible. As one practitioner
experienced in the field described the problem, many clients ask him, 'How much
integration do we have to have to get this network approved?' The implication is that the
group is anxious to do the minimum amount the Agencies require to demonstrate
'integration' so that they can realize whatever power their united bargainingposition can
achieve. Antitrust law should insist that to avoid per se treatment, price-fixing must be
ancillary to integration,not vice versa," (emphasis added)).
91. Stephen H. Siegel, Consolidation of Physicians and Other Noninstitutional
Providers, 72 FLA. B.J. 18, 19-20 (1998) ("For many physicians their primary objective has
become to regain some control over their economic and professional future in a climate of
reduced reimbursement rates ...An individual physician is not likely to have significant
ability to negotiate with an HMO. A group of physicians may have improved bargaining
'clout."').
92. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. The MedSouth Staff Opinion is suffused with optimism with respect to the IT and
administrative costs associated with getting the IPA off the ground. For example, the FTC
addresses at great length the benefits MedSouth hopes (and plans) to reap from its common
clinical information technology systems, and it emphasizes that "[t]he cost of developing the
system is spread over a larger number of practices, and those physicians who are less
knowledgeable about information technology can benefit from the experience and interest of
those who are more conversant with it." MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *7.
However, the Commission effectively ignores any potential costs to the project by relegating
to a footnote the fact that "[in this instance, much of the cost of developing the system is
being borne by MedSouth's partners-the system vendor and a clinical laboratory
company." Id. at *7 n. 10.
94. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *9 (noting that MedSouth's current
members are 51% of the internists, 33% of the family practitioners, and from 50% to 100%
of the specialists in 19 other practice areas at Swedish Hospital; additionally, MedSouth's
current members are 44% of the family practice physicians, 48% of the internists, and from
50% to 100% of the specialists in 21 other fields at the two Adventist hospitals).
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FTC dismisses the potential for MedSouth's antitrust violations because
"we do not know how many of these physicians will remain members of
MedSouth after the venture is launched. A significant decrease in the
number of MedSouth participating physicians would lessen the risk of anticompetitive harm." 95 What remains altogether unclear is why the FTC
believes MedSouth would lose participating physicians after the launch of
the joint venture. Presumably, the Commission's approval of the MedSouth
proposal is premised on the likelihood that the IPA will generate procompetitive efficiencies on balance. A participating physician would be
reluctant to leave an efficiency-generating IPA in order to compete on her
own against her erstwhile joint partners and against larger and even more
powerful HMOs. Physicians' abandonment of the MedSouth project would
seem to suggest both that the IPA was insufficiently "integrated,, 96 and as a
consequence, its price-fixing arrangement is less likely to be deemed
"ancillary" to the enterprise. 97
The FTC's presumption that some members of MedSouth will leave after
the IPA is launched is made even more curious by the investments of time
and money that will be necessary to get MedSouth off the ground. In
addition to the exorbitant expenses that will be required to hardwire the
IPA's clinical guidelines into its common electronic medical record,
MedSouth will also face huge administrative costs in implementing
common credentialing and utilization review procedures. Each of these
investments is explicitly mandated by Statement Eight, which requires that
physicians invest "significant ... capital, both monetary and human," in the
necessary infrastructure and the capability to realize the claimed
efficiencies. 98 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the network
95. Id.
96. See infra Section 111.C., notes 161-210 and accompanying text.
97. Miles, supra note 19, at 137-38 (arguing that "a restraint is ancillary if: (1) it is
related to and implemented in connection with a venture that itself is likely to generate
significant pro-competitive effects through significant partial economic integration; (2) it
significantly promotes the venture's achievement of those effects; and (3) there is no obvious
method for promoting those effects that would have a significantly less restrictive effect on
competition."); Joseph Kattan & David A. Balto, Analyzing Joint Ventures' Ancillary
Restraints, ANTITRUST, Fall 1993, at 14 ("Assessment of the pro-competitive potential turns
on whether the restraint is reasonably necessary for the efficiencies sought to be achieved by
the restraint. A restraint is reasonably necessary if it is "substantially related to the efficiency
enhancing or pro-competitive purposes" of the venture and the efficiencies cannot be
obtained through means that are less restrictive of competition." (footnotes omitted)); BORK,
supra note 35, at 266 (an ancillary restraint is "subordinate to the main transaction,"
"contribute[s] to its efficiency," and is "no broader than the need it serves"); SULLIVAN,
supra note 61, § 77, at 208 (defining ancillary restraint as a "restraint which is a necessary
consequence of some degree of integration of distribution functions").
98. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § 8(B)(1). See also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
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is not a sham and that the physicians involved have a stake in the success of
the network as an enterprise. 99 But by presuming that MedSouth will prove
to be more than a mere sham, the FTC effectively puts the cart before its
antitrust horse: the rule of reason/per se dichotomy is intended to filter out
facially anti-competitive farces.100 However, giving an IPA-joint venture
the benefit of the doubt that it will be able to complete a highly ambitious
(and arguably impossible) clinical integration plan may prove to be an illconceived misapplication of both the per se rule and the rule of reason.
Federal antitrust authorities have retained both analytical instruments
precisely because the differences between them give policymakers and
judges a convenient schema within which to judge the audaciousness of
paradigm-shifting business models like MedSouth's. The mere fact that the
FTC was willing to bless MedSouth's clinical integration proposal does not
mean that other federal antitrust authorities will be similarly charitable and
trusting. The FTC's credulous treatment of the MedSouth proposal
arguably does a disservice to other "joint-(ad)venturers" because it
encourages future entrepreneurs to expose themselves to antitrust
vanquishment without firm guidance with respect to the likely legal
implications of their business plans.
In sum, the FTC's analysis of MedSouth as an EPA-joint venture left
unresolved two fundamental questions regarding the huge investment and
"clinical integration" requirements that the Commission seems to take for
granted. First, why would anyone ever leave the MedSouth IPA? Either the
physicians will be tied to the joint venture by the huge up-front costs
required to launch their project, in which case they are unlikely to leave,
even in the absence of pro-competitive efficiencies, or they will not make
huge capital investments, in which case they are unlikely to leave
voluntarily because the PA would provide a shield for fee-for-service
price-fixing that would otherwise be impossible. Second, the investment
and "clinical integration" requirements raise the question of how much the
network physicians must invest both in the aggregate and on a per99. The agencies assume that if the physicians do not have a stake in its success, the
efficiencies might not be achieved, and the network might be used merely as a vehicle to
coordinate fees among the physicians. See, e.g., In re Southbank IPA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 783
(1991); see also Miles, supra note 19, at 144 & n.66 (discussing "sham networks").
100. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 127-28 (1993)
(explaining that under the per se rule, a category of restraints may be deemed so anticompetitive in nature that it can be presumed illegal a priori-without an elaborate analysis
of the history, purpose, and effect of the restraint). Ross notes that the per se rule is applied
in a case where the court, by experience, can "predict with confidence that the rule of reason
will condemn [the restraint]." Id. at 128. See also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and
the Per se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 464 (1966); M.
Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 247, 296 (2003).
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physician basis to qualify for rule-of-reason treatment. Presumably, there is
some undefined threshold investment level, below which the FTC would
condemn MedSouth as per se illegal. Even if the physicians are adequately
invested and the joint venture is adequately "clinically integrated," the
FTC's analysis proceeds along the lines of a rule-of-reason inquiry that
parallels a court's analysis in a private antitrust enforcement action. Thus,
even if MedSouth is cleared by the FTC, the IPA's antitrust considerations
are far from finished.
III.

BEYOND THE

FTC

The "adventures" inherent in MedSouth's proposed joint venture extend
beyond section 5 of the FTC Act.
However, the short shrift the
Commission gave to the per se rule and the Commission's nebulous
application of the rule of reason are indicative of broader uncertainties
surrounding health care antitrust. In this Part, I trace the federal courts'
movement away from strict applications of the per se rule and towards a
uniformly ill-defined rule of reason. The ambiguities presented in this
Part-combined with the incertitude inherent in the FTC's analysis
presented above-serve as the foundations for the policy recommendations
presented in Part IV.
In addition to the FTC's inquiry, MedSouth's EPA proposal raises
antitrust issues under the merger provisions of the Clayton Act, as well as
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Fortunately for MedSouth, the per se
rule has become increasingly unpopular in antitrust caselaw, as evidenced
by at least five examples of the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to
invoke Socony- Vacuum's 10 1 categorical bar on price fixing. First, the
Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to normally per se illegal
restraints when it identified joint ventures that essentially created a new
product or established new efficiencies through integration.10 2 Second, the
Court has noted that not all joint ventures that have an impact on price are
per se violations of the Sherman Act.1 0 3 Third, the Court has realized that
certain industries require horizontal restraints in order to produce a

101. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), was the first case
in which the Court held price fixing as a category to be per se illegal under the Sherman Act.
However, thirteen years earlier the Court had invoked the ad hoc application of the per se
rule in its holding that a detailed industry analysis was gratuitous in the context of the
defendants' price-fixing agreement because of the difficulty in monitoring price
reasonableness and the power exerted over the market with the attendant potential for harm.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
102. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1979).
103. Id. at 23.
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particular product. 104 Fourth, the Court has recognized that it cannot always
describe the types of business activities that should automatically fall into
the forbidden per se category. 10 5 Fifth and finally, the Court expressed its
unwillingness to adhere to a rigid per se analysis where the economic
impact of particular activities is not immediately clear. 10 6 Many appellate
court decisions have supported the Court's reluctance
to adhere to a
07
summary condemnation of certain business practices. 1
Joint ventures raise three general sets of antitrust issues. First, antitrust
issues routinely arise when a joint venture is formed; second, others seek to
join an existing joint venture; and third, a joint venture puts limits on
competition among its members or between itself and its members (socalled "ancillary restraints"). These issues present distinct, though related,
legal questions, and this section explores each in turn.
A. Formation

With formation, the threshold question is whether the venture is a true
joint venture, or merely a price-fixing cartel in disguise.'0 8 While the
definition of a joint venture is necessarily flexible and inexact, all true joint
ventures involve some degree of cooperation to achieve a legitimate
competitive objective. Firms that intend only to fix prices or allocate
markets may claim the joint venture label, but a court will not countenance
a sham joint venture that has no apparent purpose other than to restrict
competition.109 Thus, beyond the FTC, MedSouth's first antitrust hurdle
104. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
100 (1984).
105. N.W. Wholesaler Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
294 (1985).
106. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
107. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985);
Nat'l Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter Nat'l Bancard], cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d
210. These courts found efficiencies through integration as well as other pro-competitive
benefits resulting from an agreement or collaboration among competitors that included
restraints that are normally illegal per se. For a summary of these cases and others, see
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 393-428 (4th ed. 1997).
108. Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66
ANTITRUST L. J. 701, 712 (1998) ("Perhaps the most important feature that distinguishes
cartels from other joint ventures is the absence of a potentially efficiency-enhancing
economic integration among the participants.").
109. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) ("Nor
do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that agreements between
legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and
others can be justified by labeling the project a 'joint venture.' Perhaps every agreement and
combination to restrain trade could be so labeled."); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., 498 U.S. 46, 4950 (1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter Palmer] (finding "unlawful on its face" an agreement

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss1/6

24

Oldham: The MedSouth Joint - (Ad)venture the Antitrust Implications of Vi

2005]

MedSouth Joint-(Ad)venture

will be to convince its competitors (or, more precisely, its competitors'
lawyers and the judges to whom they are prone to complain) that its IPAbased joint venture is more than a mere pretextual charade designed to give
cover to physicians' price-fixing ploys.
If an incipient joint venture is more than a blatant sham, courts will use
the rule of reason to analyze the competitive effects likely to flow from its
"formation." 110 In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,"1 the
government challenged the formation of a joint venture by Pennsalt
Chemicals Corporation (Penn) and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation
(Olin) under both section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The district court rejected the government's challenge, concluding that
both Penn and Olin would not have entered the relevant market absent the
joint venture. Although it did not disturb the district court's finding on the
entry of Penn and Olin, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's
decision by analogizing joint ventures to mergers. Having held that the
government could challenge the proposed joint venture under section 7 of
the Clayton Act, it applied that statute's "probability of a lessening of
competition" standard." 12 Under that standard, the Court held, the district
court should have decided whether either Penn or Olin would have entered
the market independently and whether the other would have remained a
significant potential competitor. 113
between competitors that tied a covenant not to compete to a revenue sharing formula); see
also HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § (8)(A)(4) (explaining that sharing of
substantial financial risk "is a clear and reliable indicator that a physician network involves
sufficient integration by its physician participants to achieve significant efficiencies").
110. Micah Berman, The "Quality Health Care Coalition Act": Can Antitrust Law
Improve Patient Care?, 53 STAN. L. REv. 695, 706 (2000); Robert J. Enders, Hospital
Counseling Issues: The Antitrust "Hot Spots " in ContractingNetworks, in ANTITRUST AND
HEALTH CARE: NEW APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES 129, 134 (Douglas C. Ross ed. 1998).
See In re Preferred Physicians, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988) (consent order prohibiting
agreement among doctors to resist competitive pressures from health plans to discount fees
and to refuse reimbursement on any basis other than the traditional fee-for-service method of
payment); HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, § (8)(C)(3) (stating that an IPA will

be challenged as per se unlawful where it is "merely a vehicle for collective decisions by its
physicians on price and other significant terms of dealing" and where "[t]he physicians'
purpose in forming the IPA is to increase their bargaining power with payers").
111. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
112. Id. at 168, 173-74. The Court noted that "[c]ertainly the sole test would not be the
probability that both companies would have entered the market. Nor would the consideration
be limited to the probability that one entered alone. There still remained for consideration the
fact that Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the corporation that might have
remained at the edge of the market, continually threatening to enter. Just as a merger
eliminates actual competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect of
competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the relevant sodium chlorate market." Id.at 173.
113. Id. at 175-76. The Court noted that "[t]he existence of an aggressive, well equipped
and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting
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In Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 114 the FTC seemingly applied Penn-Olin
in challenging a proposed joint venture between Yamaha and Brunswick.' 15
At the time, Brunswick was the second largest manufacturer of outboard
motors in the United States, and Yamaha was a significant importer through
its subsidiary Sanshin. 116 Under the terms of their agreement, Brunswick
and Yamaha would become co-owners of Sanshin. Brunswick would gain
the exclusive right to sell Sanshin motors under its brand in North America
and several other markets, while Yamaha would gain the exclusive right to
sell Sanshin motors under its brand in Japan." 17 Then-Commissioner
Pitofsky found that the agreement violated section 7 of the Clayton Act and
section 5 of the FTC Act." 8
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with the FTC that there was
ample evidence that Yamaha had the "means for entering the American
outboard-motor market." 119 It expressly rejected Brunswick's argument
that in order to enter the market Yamaha needed a dealer network because,
inter alia, Yamaha had widespread name recognition in the United States, a
network of motorcycle dealers through which it could sell motors, and most
dealers of marine motors were signed to only one-year contracts. 2 ° It
found the various ancillary agreements wholly unjustified. 121
While the Tenth Circuit (which includes MedSouth's operations in
Colorado) has never had the chance to apply the Penn-Olin doctrine to the
formation of a joint venture, the Tenth Circuit has applied Yamaha Motor's
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition
which cannot be underestimated." Id. at 174. On remand, the district court found that neither
Penn nor Olin would have entered the relevant market independent of the joint-venture and
so dismissed the government's action. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp.
917 (D. Del. 1965). The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam by an equally divided court.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
114. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 977 (applying Penn-Olin's "actual potential entrant doctrine," under which §
7 of the Clayton Act bars "acquisitions by a large firm in an oligopolistic market, if the
acquisition eliminate[s] the acquired firm as a potential competitor, and if the acquired firm
would otherwise have been expected to enter the relevant market de novo").
116. Id. at 973-74.
117. Id. at 974. Other provisions of the agreement (1) prevented Yamaha from
manufacturing or re- selling engines similar to those made by Sanshin, (2) limited
competition between Yamaha and Brunswick in those markets where both could sell
Sanshin-produced motors, and (3) forbade Brunswick from producing products, other than
snowmobiles, in competition with Yamaha. Id.
118. Id. at 975-76.
119. Yamaha Motor, 657 F.2d at 979.
120. Id. at 977-78.
121. Id. at 981. The court struck down the parties' territorial limitation agreement, the
parties' "non-exclusive markets" agreement, and the parties' "Technical Assistance
Agreement," which, inter alia, granted reciprocal licenses to use each other's technical
information.
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analysis in affirming an FTC divestiture order against a merger that would
create even greater entry barriers in the highly oligopolistic coal industry. 22
B. Participation
A second important group of joint venture antitrust issues relates to the
question of access or "membership." Unlike formation issues, which
generally involve the enforcement agencies and frequently are resolved
without much, if any, public discussion, the question of access to joint
venture property (through membership
or otherwise) has been the subject of
23
litigation.1
private
frequent
relatively
1. From PerSe to the Rule of Reason
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that
associations could run afoul of the antitrust laws by failing to deal on nondiscriminatory terms with competitors of members of the association. 24 In
a series of cases, the Supreme Court slowly extended this principle until it
reached the conclusion that any "concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders" 125were subject to per se condemnation under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court extended its per se analysis in the leading "essential
facility," or duty-to-deal case, United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association of St. Louis.126 St. Louis Terminal involved a joint venture of
122. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972). In Kennecott, the
FTC imposed a divestiture order after plaintiff copper producer agreed to merge with a
leading coal company. The court affirmed and held that competition would be lessened
should the conglomerate merger occur because the merger would have the effect of creating
entry barriers and the market would become a tight oligopoly. Id. at 77-78. The court also
found that plaintiff was a potential entrant into the coal industry and exerted substantial
influence on the market which would be highly concentrated after a merger. Id. at 78-79.
123. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp. of Independence, Kan., 854 F.2d 365 (10th
Cir. 1988) (hospital's denial of physician's staff privileges did not constitute antitrust
violation, under essential facilities doctrine, in that hospital's facilities were not essential to
physician's medical practice under § 2 of the Sherman Act), overruledby Systemcare, Inc. v.
Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (1997); McElhinney v. Med. Protective Co., 549 F. Supp.
121 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (joint venture on part of defendant hospital and three staff physicians
concerning alleged refusal to deal with plaintiff surgeon did not fall within the group boycott
category requiring application of the per se rule where direct competitors of plaintiff were
not involved in a refusal to deal, remaining defendants were not competitors but members of
an illusory or hypothetical medical team, there was glaring absence of evidence that
members of medical team possessed any sort of monopolistic powers, and even if
defendants' actions were labeled a group boycott, the per se rule was not applicable because
the restraints were at most temporary and for purpose of improving morale).
124. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
125. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
126. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) [hereinafter
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railroads that controlled transit across the Mississippi in St. Louis at the turn
of the century. 127 At the time, approximately twenty-four railroads
1 28
terminated on either the Missouri or Illinois side of the river at St. Louis.
A system of ferries and bridges enabled railroad cars to move from one side
of the river to another.1 29 In 1899, fourteen of these railroads, under the
leadership of Jay Gould, formed an association to acquire the various ferries
and bridges.1 30 The rules of the association required the members to use the
associations' facilities exclusively, and unanimous consent of the current
members for either admission
of new members or use of the associations'
1
facilities by non-members.13
The Supreme Court concluded that this arrangement violated the
Sherman Act. 32 Aside from concluding that the terminal association was
an "essential facility," the Court found that the association had failed to
meet the "impartial agency" standard. 133 It took particular issue with the
association's "arbitrary discrimination" of non-members, finding it
"obviously injurious to the commerce and manufacturers of St. Louis. 134
However, the Court did not, as the government had asked, order the
dissolution of the association.135 Rather, consistent with its finding on
discrimination, the Court ordered the association to allow all railroads to
use the association's facilities on non-discriminatory terms."'
In Associated Press v. United States,' 37 the government charged that the
St. Louis Terminal].
127. Id. at 391.
128. Id. at 392-93.
129. Id.
130. Id. at391.
131. Id. at 399-400.

132.

United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).

133.

Id. at410-11.

134.

Id. at408.

135. ld. at 410-11.

136. Id. at 410-11. The Tenth Circuit applied St. Louis Terminal most recently in
McKenzie. McKenzie, 854 F.2d at 369. In McKenzie, the court held that a plaintiff's claim
under the "essential facilities doctrine" "must show (1) that Mercy Hospital controls
emergency room and obstetrical care facilities that are essential to competition in the
northern half of Montgomery County, Kansas; (2) his own inability to duplicate, practically
or economically, the emergency room and obstetrical care facilities that Mercy Hospital
controls; (3) a denial by Mercy Hospital of the use of its emergency room and obstetrical
care facilities; and (4) the feasibility of Mercy Hospital sharing its emergency room and
obstetrical care facilities without impairing its own ability to care for patients adequately. It
is Dr. McKenzie's task to demonstrate the presence of all these elements of an essential
facilities claim in the facts of this case. If even one element is absent, his argument under the
doctrine is unavailing." Id. at 370. Dr. McKenzie's § 2 claim failed because even without
access to the defendant's facilities, he was able to continue competing against the defendant
hospital by performing obstetrical care in his clinic. Id. at 371.
137. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
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Associated Press violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The core of
the government's challenge was directed at the AP's bylaws "which
prohibited all AP members from selling news to non-members, and which
granted each member powers to block its non-member competitors from
membership.' 38 The Supreme Court agreed explaining that "the Sherman
act was specifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from
becoming 'associates' in a common plan which is bound to reduce their
competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which the groups
compete."' 39 The Court rejected the AP's argument that its rules did not
40
violate the Sherman Act because competing news services existed.
The Court's per se analyses of joint venture formations ended in
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co.,' 4 ' in which Pacific Stationery claimed that Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, a purchasing cooperative, treated members more favorably than
non-members. According to the Supreme Court, its long line of per se
group boycott cases often involved "access to a supply, facility, or market
necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete.' 42 Having reconceived
these cases as involving some essential facility, the Court inquired whether
the challenged practice merited per se treatment. Finding that exclusion
from a wholesale purchasing co-op likely would not result in anticompetitive effects, the Court declined to apply the per se rule. In so doing,
the Court followed its earlier opinion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,
Inc. 143
Although the risk of a per se claim looms, lower courts have been
faithful to Northwest Wholesale Stationers' reformulation of the group
boycott cases. 144 In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,145 an

138. Id.
139. Id. at 15.
140. The Tenth Circuit most recently followed Associated Press in Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding defendant ski
resort liable for violating § 2 under the essential facilities doctrine because defendant
controlled three of the four skiing mountains in the Aspen area, and defendant's intent in
refusing to market a multi-day multi-mountain ticket with plaintiff was to create or maintain
a monopoly).
141. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
142. Id. at 294.
143. 441 U.S. 1.
144. For example, in Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation,Inc., 152 F.3d 48
(1st Cir. 1998), the First Circuit declined the plaintiff's invitation to invoke the per se rule in
its review of a joint venture intended to produce a new software package. The court
explained that "courts have been very careful to confine per se treatment to conduct of the
type that is almost always actually or potentially anti-competitive and has no redeeming
benefits (e.g., reduced costs, increased competition) worthy of being weighed against the
negative effects." Id. at 51. The court held that "[j]oint venture enterprises ... unless they
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independent moving company challenged Atlas's decision to terminate its
affiliation with moving companies that "persisted in handling interstate
carriage on [their] own account as well as for Atlas."'146 Rothery insisted
that because Atlas was a joint venture of 490 independent moving
companies and not a single carrier, these rules amounted to a "group
After recounting the long and somewhat tortured
boycott."' 147
jurisprudential prelude to Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the D.C. Circuit
refused to apply the "group boycott" doctrine to Rothery's claim. Instead,
it read Northwest Wholesale Stationers "[to make] explicit what had always
been understood ... that 'not all concerted refusals to deal should be
accorded per se treatment."",148 The D.C. Circuit, therefore, rejected
Rothery's claim that exclusion from a joint venture amounted to a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.
Membership issues were also at the core of SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA,
Inc. (Dean Witter). 149 Visa was a joint venture of some 6,000 financial
institutions that allowed new members to join at any time. Although Visa
reserved the right to bar additional entry, it had excluded only two firms
from issuing Visa payment cards-its single-firm competitors American
Express and Discover (now part of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Discover).
Dean Witter challenged its exclusion from Visa as a horizontal restraint of
trade. Foreclosed by the success of its proprietary card program from
arguing that it needed access to Visa in order to compete, Dean Witter
argued that Visa, by leaving itself open to others, had shown that exclusion
was unnecessary to the success of the joint venture. Following Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, the Tenth Circuit refused to condemn Visa's
exclusionary policy per se. Instead, the court focused on "the ultimate
consumer," explaining that "[t]o be judged anti-competitive, the [policy]
must actually or potentially harm consumers."'' ° The court found no harm
to consumers because (1) the credit card issuer market in which the policy
would have any effect was unconcentrated, and (2) Dean Witter did not
need access to Visa in order to compete in that market.' 5 '
amount to complete shams ... are rarely susceptible to per se treatment." Id. at 52 (internal

citation omitted).
145.

792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

146.
147.
148.

Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 216.

149.

36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).

150.
151.

Id. at 965.
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has criticized the Tenth Circuit's decision. Where

the Tenth Circuit saw no evidence in the record of injury to competition, Professor
Hovenkamp identifies two anti-competitive forces: "(a) that the venture acting as a unit may
maximize its own profits at the expense of consumers, through tacit or express collusion; or
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2. Northwest Wholesale Stationers and Health Care
Although not a joint venture case, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of
Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic'52 illustrates the application of Northwest
Wholesale Stationers to the managed care industry. In Marshfield Clinic,
Blue Cross & Blue Shield's HMO subsidiary (Compcare) complained that
the Marshfield Clinic (a 400-member physician-owned clinic with twentyone branches) and its HMO subsidiary (Security) had excluded Compcare
from the HMO "market" in north central Wisconsin. 53 Marshfield
allegedly accomplished this goal in many ways, including acquiring
physician practices and opening new clinics in admittedly underserved rural
locations. Marshfield's HMO subsidiary (Security) operated a network
which included the 400 physicians employed by Marshfield and some 900
other independent "affiliates.' 54 The agreements with the affiliates were
nonexclusive; in addition to their HMO patients, the affiliates cared for feefor-service patients covered by indemnity insurers such as Blue Cross and
participated in other PPO and HMO networks. Marshfield's conduct
allegedly injured Blue Cross as an indemnity insurer because the Clinic
charged Blue Cross's insureds "monopoly" prices, some or all of which
Blue Cross was required to pay. Marshfield had also allegedly injured Blue
Cross's largest HMO subsidiary, co-plaintiff Compcare, by excluding it
from the market for HMO services. This was allegedly accomplished by
Marshfield's refusal to enter into a contract (on terms that Blue Cross
deemed "reasonable") to make its employed physicians part of Compcare's
HMO network.
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, held that absent a
showing of monopoly power, a facility would not be considered essential.
The court rejected Compcare's argument that the clinic's reputation for
excellence could substitute for a showing of monopoly power: "[t]he
suggestion that the price of being 'best' is to be brought under the
regulatory aegis of antitrust law and stripped of your power to decide whom
to do business with does not identify an interest that the antitrust laws
protect."15 5 The opinion in Marshfield Clinic is indicative of courts'
increasing recognition that suppliers' exclusionary practices oftentimes
serve worthy and important quality-control functions; thus, a rigid per se

(b) that the venture may act in ways that are anti-competitive and not in the best interest of
the venture as a whole, but that are in the interest of sufficient members to control decision
making." 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST

152.
153.
154.
155.

2220, at 303 (1999).

65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id.at 1408-09.
Id.at 1409.
Id.at 1413.
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15
rule is inappropriate and counterproductive.
The Tenth Circuit followed Northwest Wholesale Stationers in Diaz v.
Farley.157 In Diaz, plaintiffs (anesthesiologists with hospital privileges)
brought an antitrust suit against three other anesthesiologists and two
business entities, alleging that the individual defendants engaged in a
horizontal group boycott in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by
refusing to schedule the plaintiffs for labor and delivery services to OBGYN patients in the Cottonwood Hospital. The court held that the
defendants did not possess market power, nor did the defendants "control
access to an element 'essential' to plaintiffs' ability to compete ... and
practice anesthesiology at Cottonwood." '58 Citing Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, the court then considered the defendants' plausible arguments
concerning possible pro-competitive effects in determining whether the per
159
se rule or the rule of reason should apply to a horizontal group boycott.
After entertaining the plausible argument that the agreements in question
actually enhanced competition by increasing a doctor's ability to choose
which anesthesiologists he or she would use at Cottonwood Hospital, the
court concluded that application of the per se rule was inappropriate and
held that the plaintiffs "failed to 'present a threshold case that the
challenged activity falls
into a category likely to have predominately anti' 160

competitive effects.'

C. Ancillary Restraints
The final set of antitrust issues raised by joint ventures is restraints on
competition among venture participants or between the joint venture and its
members. The legitimacy of a joint venture does not give its members
license to implement any anti-competitive practices it deems necessary to
maximize profit; that is, its rules must be reasonably related to the nature

156. Posner's logic from Marshfield Clinic is echoed in Levine v. Central Florida
MedicalAffiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11 th Cir. 1996). In Levine, the Eleventh Circuit held
that a physician network's decision to exclude one physician from its network was not
subject to the per se rule under a group boycott theory. Id. at 1550. See also Retina Assoc.
v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming per curiam a
district court's decision that Levine precluded a per se attack on an exclusive referral
agreement between one group of doctors and a specialist); N.W. Med. Labs., Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Or., Inc., 775 P.2d 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Capitol Imaging Assoc.,
P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assoc., Inc., 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1993); Hahn v. Or.
Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988); Hassan v. Indep. Practice Assoc., 698 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
157. 215 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
158. Id. at 1183.
159. Id. at 1183-84 (citing Northwest Wholesale Stationers,472 U.S. at 294).
160. 1d. at 1184-85 (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298).
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and needs of the joint venture.' 6' Keeping in mind the general preference
for competition over collaboration, both the permissible scope of a
venture's activities and the legitimacy of its limitations on competition must
be balanced against the efficiencies that justify the venture in the first
place. 16 In other words, the only question in cases questioning limitations
on competition among venture members or between the venture and its
members is whether the
restraint is "reasonably necessary" to the venture's
63
legitimate operations.

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.164 involved a joint venture of
twenty-five small and medium-sized supermarket chains. The joint venture
acted as a purchasing agent for its members-thus allowing its participants
to compete with private label brands of the larger chains-by buying
various grocery goods and packaging them under the Topco brand.1 65 The
United States challenged two aspects of the joint venture. First, the
government argued that Topco's membership rules gave its current
members a virtual veto over the admission of additional chains from the
regions in which existing members operated. 66 And second, the
government alleged that Topco's rules prohibited current members from
selling the brand's products outside of their licensed territories. 67 The
161. Compare Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1307-08
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd 468 U.S. 85 (1984) ("The colleges are clearly able to negotiate
agreements with whatever broadcasters they choose. We are not dealing with tens of
thousands of relatively brief musical works, but with three-hour football games played
eleven times each year."), with BM/, 441 U.S. at 22-23 ("[T]o the extent the blanket license
is a different product, ASCAP is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods
of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual
compositions are raw material. ASCAP, in short, made a market in which individual
composers are inherently unable to compete fully effectively." (footnotes omitted)).
162. See BoRK, supra note 35, at 262-79 (naked horizontal restraints should be per se
illegal, but reasonably ancillary ones should be lawful), 280-97 (all vertical restraints benefit
consumers, and thus all should be legal), 331-44 (only naked boycotts should be per se
illegal, and boycotts reasonably ancillary to productive purpose should be lawful), 365-81
(efficient tying arrangements should be legal); See also Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes
Full Circle: The Return to the CartelizationStandard,38 VAND. L. REv. 1125, 1160-61 (all
vertical restraints should be lawful), 1161-62 (horizontal price fixing and market division
should be prohibited unless defendants can demonstrate lack of market power or efficiencies
from integration), 1163-64 (joint ventures should be lawful unless they create monopoly
power), 1164-65 (boycott in support of cartel should be unlawful), 1165-66 (other horizontal
agreements should be unlawful if disguised cartels) (1985).
163. As many have noted, this approach to such agreements has its roots in the famous
opinion by Judge (later President and Chief Justice) William Howard Taft in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Rothery
Storage, 792 F.2d at 224.
164. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
165. Id. at 599-600 & n.3.
166. Id. at 602.
167. Id. at 602-03. The Government argued that Topco's market division practices
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district court, applying the rule of reason to both sets of regulations, struck
them down.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but applied a per se rule rather than the
rule of reason. According to the Court, "[o]ne of the classic examples of a
per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors.., to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition.' 1 68 Dismissing Topco's
argument that its rules actually promoted, rather than inhibited,
competition, the Court explained that it "ha[d] consistently rejected the
notion that naked restraints of trade are to be tolerated because they are well
intended or because they are allegedly developed to increase
competition. '169
The Supreme Court took a much less categorical approach to this same
issue-restraints ancillary to a joint venture-in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc. 170 BMI acted as a clearinghouse for composers. 171 Members
granted BMI non-exclusive rights to license their works for public
performance. BMI then issued and enforced those licenses, and distributed
royalties to its members. 172 CBS complained that BMI violated the
Sherman Act by offering only one license, a "blanket license," to all
compositions in its catalog for a specific term. The district court disagreed,
but the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the blanket license
arrangement was an illegal price-fixing arrangement.
violated the Sherman Act because it prohibited competition in Topco-brand products
amongst retail grocery chains. Additionally, the government's complaint cited Topco's
bylaws, under which members were not permitted to sell any products supplied by the
association at wholesale, whether trademarked or not, without first applying for and
receiving special permission from the association to do so. Before granting permission, the
defendant association would consult with other licensees (usually retailers), whose interests
potentially could be affected by wholesale operations. And while defendant's members had
repeatedly applied for permission to make wholesale agreements, Topco universally denied
each new licensing request. Id. at 603-04.
168. Id. at 608.
169. Id. at 610. Topco has been criticized, by then-chairman of the FTC, for ignoring the
joint venture character of the challenged arrangement. See Pitofsky, supra note 21, at 162021. But it continues to be cited by the Supreme Court as good law. See, e.g., Palmer, 498
U.S. at 49-50. However, at least one court has suggested that Topco's "broader proposition"
may no longer be good law. See Mass. Food Ass'n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control
Comm'n, 197 F.3d 560, 564 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Mass. Food] ("Topco may no
longer be good law for its broader proposition that such a restraint is condemned per se even
where it is ancillary to a productive joint venture. Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1, 20-24 (1979); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
224-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). But no one doubts that an
independent agreement between private parties to limit output or divide markets is to be
condemnedperse. See Palmerv. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).").
170. BM/,441 U.S. 1.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 5.
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The Supreme Court, in .turn, reversed the Second Circuit. The Court held
that although the arrangement "literally 'fixed' a 'price,"' it did not carry
the competitive consequence that warranted application of a per se rule
striking it down. 173 In essence, the Court distinguished BMI's blanket
licensing scheme on the facts, noting that it "ha[d] never examined a
practice like this one before. 174 The Court recognized that the blanket
licensing approach offered certain economic benefits, reducing both the
transaction costs that individual negotiations for particular songs would
require and the costs involved in monitoring and enforcing individual
licenses.1 75 In contrast with a truly pernicious price-fixing agreement, BMI
appeared to increase output and reduce prices. 7 6 BMI created synergistic
and pro-competitive effects that would not have been realizable in absence
of the joint venture's blanket licensing scheme. As a result, the Supreme
77
Court held application of the per se rule to be inappropriate.1
The Court again took a flexible approach to horizontal combination in
178
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (NCAA).
There, the University of Oklahoma challenged the NCAA's rules restricting
both the total number of televised college football games and the number of
games any one school could show. The University of Oklahoma claimed
that the rules were classic horizontal restraints of trade and asked the courts
to strike them down as per se illegal.
The Supreme Court struck down the NCAA's rules, but in sharp contrast
with Topco, the Court applied the rule of reason. 79 Building on BMI,180 the
173. Id. at 9.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id.at20-21.
176. BMI, 441 U.S. at 22 n.40.
177. Id. at 24. The Court rationalized the synergetic and pro-competitive effects of the
blanket license thus: "The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus
the aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to
some extent, a different product." Id. at 21-22.
178. 468 U.S. 85.
179. Id. at 100-01. The Court explained: "Horizontal price fixing and output limitation
are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because the
probability that these practices are anti-competitive is so high; aperse rule is applied 'when
the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.' In such circumstances a restraint is presumed
unreasonable without inquiry into the particular market context in which it is found.
Nevertheless, we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this
case. This decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of
arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our respect
for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate
amateur athletics. Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential ifthe product is to be availableat all." Id.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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Court synthesized the per se rule and the rule of reason explaining that
under either rubric, "the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not
the challenged restraint enhances competition.'' 8 1 Although the Court
expressed sympathy for the NCAA's position that its rule simply preserved
the integrity of the game and was intended to help college football compete
with other sports, 182 the Court refused to disturb the district court's
findings
183
that the rules had actually raised prices and restricted output.

By the end of the 1980s, the combination of BM and NCAA had cast
doubt over the current viability of Topco's per se rule.' 84 Finally, in
California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (California
Dental), 185 the Court reconsidered how flexible a court should be in
analyzing an association rule. CaliforniaDental involved a challenge by the
FTC to a rule of the California Dental Association (CDA) that limited the
ability of member dentists to advertise their prices. 186 The Commission
challenged the agreement as a naked restraint of trade. The appellate court
affirmed the FTC, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Ninth
Circuit had erred by taking only a "quick look."' 87 The Court explained
that given the professional context, the economic consequences of a rule

180. BMI, 441 U.S. 1. The NCAA Court noted that BMI "squarely holds that a joint
selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and
thus be pro-competitive." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
181. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
182. Id. at 101-02. The Court also cited Judge Bork's use of league sports as the classic
illustration of a joint venture. See BORK, supra note 35, at 278 ("some activities can only be
carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When a league of
professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation
illegal on the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.").
183. NCAA, 468 at 106-07 ("The anti-competitive consequences of this arrangement are
apparent. Individual competitors lose their freedom to compete. Price is higher and output
lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference. This
latter point is perhaps the most significant, since "'Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
'consumer welfare prescription."" (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979) (footnotes omitted)).
184. Some courts have recognized that the combination of BMI and NCAA has the effect
of limiting Topco's per se rule. See Mass. Food, 197 F.3d at 564 n.2; See also Miles, supra
note 19, at 145-47 (discussing the effect of BM and NCAA on Topco).
185. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
186. Seventy-five percent of the dentists in California were members of the CDA.
CaliforniaDental, 121 F.T.C. 190, 196 (1996).
187. The "quick look" rule grew out of NSPE's holding that "no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anti-competitive character of' horizontal agreements
among competitors to refuse to discuss prices. Nat'l Soc. of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Under the rule of reason's "quick-look" analysis, an observer
with "even a rudimentary understanding of economics" could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anti-competitive effect on customers and markets.
NCAA, 468 U.S. 99-100.
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barring price advertising were not obvious. 188 The Court remanded the case
to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to consider more carefully whether the
California Dental Association's restrictions on price advertising would, in
fact, harm competition. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
Commission had failed to prove that the challenged rules restricted
competition. 189
Taking their cue from BM and NCAA, the circuit courts have evidenced
a new willingness to uphold horizontal restraints, once summarily
condemned as per se unlawful, by analogizing them to joint ventures or, at
least where market power is not shown, as ancillary restraints.' 9" In
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Association,191 for
example, the Seventh Circuit considered defendant's joint venture (the
National Truck Leasing Association (NTLA)), which was an association of
130 companies that leased trucks to businesses. 192 As a part of its strategy
to compete against national companies like Hertz and Avis, the NTLA
established reciprocal obligations among the affiliated companies, allowing
those companies to service their trucks across the country. Among other
things, NTLA granted its members a franchise on a particular location and
forbid them from operating as an NTLA affiliate elsewhere. 193 General
Leaseways-a member-participant in the defendant's joint venture--defied
those rules and raised an antitrust
objection when the NTLA attempted to
94
expel it from the organization. 1
The Seventh Circuit affirmed an injunction against NTLA's anti188. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771 ("the CDA's advertising restrictions might
plausibly be thought to have a net pro-competitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition. The restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on
their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by
striking disparities between the information available to the professional and the patient."
(footnotes omitted)).
189. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2000).
190. See, e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1480-83 (9th Cir. 1986)
(hybrid horizontal/vertical relationship due to dual distributorships warranted analysis under
rule-of-reason approach), modified 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987); Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d
at 223-30 (restraints were horizontal in nature, but were ancillary and clearly incapable of
suppressing market competition), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Nat'l Bancard, 779
F.2d at 601-02 (complex market relationship suggestive of a joint venture not subject to per
se scrutiny because of its necessity to functioning of system), cert. denied 479 U.S. 923
(1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (ancillary
restraint made cooperation and increased production possible so rule of reason applies);
Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir. 1984) (lack of
market power makes these horizontal restraints not subject to per se classification).
191. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
192. Id. at 589.
193. Id. at 590.
194. Id.
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competitive behavior. Writing for the court, Judge Posner characterized
BMI and NCAA as cases in which the Supreme Court recognized that
cooperation among competitors might benefit consumers where the
competitors' restraints are merely ancillary to their larger, lawful, and procompetitive purposes. 195 He explained, however, that this principle has a
limit: "[i]t does not follow that because two firms sometimes have a
cooperative relationship there are no competitive gains from forbidding
them to cooperate in ways that yield no economies but simply limit
competition.' 96 The court applied the per se rule to NTLA's policies
because, after taking a "quick look," it found NTLA to be "a horizontal
to the reciprocal
market division that does not appear to be ancillary
' 97
provision of service or any other lawful activity."'
The Seventh Circuit's cautionary opinion in General Leaseways should
make clear, the mere fact that a joint venture has a lawful, pro-competitive
purpose does not give that joint venture license to adopt rules unrelated to
its purpose. For example, in Law v. NCAA, 98 the Tenth Circuit quickly
dispatched an NCAA rule that limited compensation for entry level coaches
to $16,000 per year, finding that on balance the NCAA could not justify this
restraint as reasonable. 99 However, if the joint venture can survive a
"quick look" test, its horizontal restraints are increasingly likely to pass
muster under the BMI-NCAA analyses because courts are increasingly
willing to accept evidence of pro-competitive effects proffered by
195. Id. at 595:
NCAA may seem to go a step beyond [BM/] toward a regime in which only
unreasonable horizontal restraints are illegal, because the Court in NCAA did not
condition the applicability of the Rule of Reason on proof that the particular
restriction that had been challenged was necessary if the product was to be
brought to market at all. There was, however, a plausible connection between the
specific restriction and the essential character of the product. Since the balance of
power among the teams in the NCAA might be disturbed by disparities in team
wealth, limiting the ability of the more popular teams to cash in on their
popularity through unrestricted televising of their games might have promoted the
NCAA's essential lawful objectives. It was arguable, in other words, that the
television output restriction was 'ancillary' to a lawful main purpose.
196. Id. at 594.
197. GeneralLeaseways, 744 F.2d at 595.
198. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
199. Applying the "quick look" rule-of-reason test, the court noted that "anticompetitive effect is established, even without a determination of the relevant market, where
the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that the agreement is
effective, and that the price set by such an agreement is more favorable to the defendant than
otherwise would have resulted from the operation of market forces." 134 F.3d at 1020. The
court held that the anti-competitive harm of cutting salaries from $60,000 to $16,000
outweighed the defendant's pro-competitive arguments (that the league's desire to (1) retain
low-level coaching positions, (2) contain recent trends of rapid inflation in coaches' salaries,
and (3) maintain competitiveness in college sports). Id. at 1021-24.
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According to Judge Bork's opinion in Rothery,20 1 the BM/

and NCAA cases forsook Topco and returned the law to Judge Taft's
original formulation: "an ancillary horizontal restraint, one that is part of an
integration of the economic activities of the parties and appears capable of
enhancing the group's efficiency, is to be judged according to its purpose
and effect., 20 2 In contrast to the policy at issue in General Leaseways, the
challenged rule in Rothery simply prevented Atlas's members from freeriding on the efficiencies made possible by the entire organization and its
attendant horizontal restraints.20 3 Indeed, in striking down the defendants'
anti-competitive policies in General Leaseways, Judge Posner noted that an
evidentiary showing of a free-rider problem would go a long way to
substantiating the joint venture's pro-competitive effects. 2°
D. Conclusion
In sum, while some patterns may be discemable, the antitrust principles
underlying joint ventures' ancillary restraints nevertheless remain unclear.
BM/and NCAA have carved out large exceptions to Topco's per se rule, but
joint ventures do not possess carte blanche to implement unrelated and
unreasonable horizontal restraints of trade. In recent years, courts have
increasingly required antitrust plaintiffs to prove actual evidence of anticompetitive effects, 20 5 and courts have increasingly agreed to balance
evidence of pro-competitive effects (such as the prevention of free-riding
and the creation of welfare-enhancing efficiencies) against the facially antiNevertheless, vast uncertainty
competitive effects of price-fixing.
surrounds the degree of connection the courts will require between a joint
venture's lawful purposes and its avowedly efficiency-enhancing horizontal
restraints. BM and NCAA seem to require the restraint to be "essential" to
the joint venture's pro-competitive effects; but the Supreme Court's earlier
2 °6 as well as several
cases (most notably Northwest Wholesale Stationers),
200. See, e.g., Nat'l Bancard,779 F.2d at 601 (holding Visa's "interchange" policy was
"a necessary element in the creation of [an] efficiency creating integration").
201. See Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d 210; see also supra text accompanying notes 54,
145-48.
202. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 229.
203. Id.at 223.
204. General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 592-93.
205. Post-CaliforniaDental courts have been less reluctant to throw out challenges to
association rules that are not accompanied by evidence of anti-competitive effects. For
example, in Viazis v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002), the court
upheld a judgment as a matter of law in favor of an association. The court held that a
plaintiff challenging the professional association's advertising restrictions was required to
present data demonstrating that the restrictions have a net anti-competitive effect. Id.at 766.
206. Northwest Wholesale Stationers set forth no requirement that the restraint be
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lower court cases (most notably General Leaseways and Rothery),2°7 seem
only to require that the restraint is "substantially" or "reasonably related" to
the joint venture's pro-competitive effects.
These ambiguities in the caselaw.dovetail nicely with Statement 8 of the
Health Care Statements, as applied by the FTC.2 8 According to Statement
8, the restraint must be "reasonably necessary to realize [the network's]
efficiencies, 20 9 which seems to be a middle ground between the restraint
having to be "essential" to and having to be "related" to the venture's
efficiency-generating policies and/or restraints.2 10 Of course, any standard
based on "reasonableness" is inherently uncertain-and it is precisely this
sense of uncertainty that threatens to impede the innovative formation of
new joint ventures. Thus, in the following section, I attempt to formulate
an efficiency model for joint venture-IPAs that circumvents some of the ex
ante riskiness inherent in pioneering new quality- and cost-effective
solutions in modem health care markets.
IV. AN EFFICIENCY MODEL FOR MEDSOUTH (SANS "ADVENTURE")
As the forgoing discussion should make clear, the per se and rule-ofreason rubrics are highly fact-specific, and it is often difficult (or
impossible) to generalize across cases or to make prospective predictions
about the likely outcome of a given court's analysis of a given joint venture.
Nevertheless, the competitive forces operating on the health care industry
are undeniable, and independent practitioners are increasingly challenged
by the threat of losing their autonomy and/or their heretofore sizable feefor-service margins. 21 Thus, would-be innovators-like the physicians
"essential." Rather, the Court noted that the type of cooperative venture involved in that case
had to "establish and enforce reasonable rules in order to function effectively." 472 U.S. at
296. In a footnote, the Court then suggested that the restraint only had to be "substantially
related to the efficiency-enhancing or pro-competitive purposes" of the venture. Id. at 296
n.7.
207. General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 595 (for a restraint to be ancillary, there must be
some "organic connection" between the restraint and the cooperative needs of the joint
venture; here, there was "no reason... that cooperation requires that members be forbidden
to compete with each other"); Rothery, 792 F.2d at 224 ("To be ancillary, and hence exempt
from the per se rule, an agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and
collateral in the sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effective in
accomplishing its purpose. Of course, the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency
sought to be achieved. If it is so broad that part of the restraint suppresses competition
without creating efficiency, the restraint is, to that extent, not ancillary.").
208. See supra notes 54-98 and accompanying text.
209. HEALTH CARE STATEMENTS, supra note 11, at § (8)(B)(1).
210. Miles, supranote 19, at 147-48.
211. See, e.g., Carl J. Schramm & Steven C. Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market
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comprising MedSouth-face a daunting dilemma: they can form a joint
venture and risk ambiguous application of antitrust principles, or they can
resist the forces of horizontal integration and hope to ride out managed care
organizations' competitive tidal wave. By positing an efficiency model that
removes some of the uncertainty, that is-that is, some of the
"adventure"--from an antitrust analysis of an IPA-joint venture like
MedSouth, this Part attempts to give independent physicians their cake,
while allowing them to eat it, too.
MedSouth has identified an alternative business plan that promises to
preserve individual physicians' economic viability outside of large HMO
networks, while also allowing them to bargain collectively for attractive
fee-for-service contracts. However, as one FTC commissioner recently
noted, the ex ante risks facing a group of would-be joint-venture operators
are huge.2" 2 Notwithstanding the FTC's blessing in its February 2002
opinion letter, if some of MedSouth's clinical integration plans are not
carried out, or if some of the IPA's predicted quality improvements do not
materialize, then "[a]s a matter of strict logic the venture should be deemed
per se illegal-perhaps even retroactively., 21 3 Per se illegality seems to be
a harsh sanction for failure to fulfill a business plan-if venture capitalists
employed a similar mindset in Silicon Valley during the 1990s, their
hostility to innovation likely would have significantly impeded the dot-com
boom.
Thus, in this section, I attempt to formalize the forgoing discussion of the
caselaw into a synthetic model of the costs and benefits of joint ventures in
general, and MedSouth's IPA proposal in particular. The fundamental
insight revealed in the model below is that contemporary antitrust law's
parochial concentration on price as the sole basis of competition is
misguided and counterproductive. 214 Focusing on price-to the exclusion
Concentrationand the Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex, 33 EMORY L.J. 869 (1984); William M.
Stelwagon, Does a Healthy Patient Need a Cure? A Response to Health Care Industry
Proposals to Reform Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Hospital Mergers, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 553 (1995); Duncan Cameron, Hospital Mergers and Joint Ventures: The Not So
Special Case, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 403 (1995); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an
Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191 (1997);
Dennis A. Yao, The Analysis of HospitalMergers andJoint Ventures: What May Change?,
1995 UTAH L. REv. 381 (1995); Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally:Antitrust
Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 Hous. L. REv. 813 (1994).
212. Leary, supra note 22, at 230.
213. Id. at 227.
214. "The microeconomic focus of contemporary antitrust doctrine tends to assess antiand pro-competitive effects predominantly in terms of implications for price and output,
even when such simple models seem forced or inappropriate given the facts of cases. In
[NCAA], for example, the colleges' collective allocation of television broadcast rights was
summarily condemned because it reduced the number of games that would be broadcast
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of non-price factors-in the formulation of antitrust policies and practices
creates uncertainty in health care markets, which operate along multiple
dimensions. 21 5 The model presented below broadens the horizons of
antitrust policy and its application to modem health care institutions by
including quality as an important measurement of competition and
efficiency. 216 By adopting an analysis similar to what follows, in
conjunction with others' ongoing attempts to quantify quality-based
variables, 217 the courts and the FTC would reduce the uncertainty facing
would-be innovators who are attempting to adapt and survive in the health
care industry's modem competitive environment.
A. The Model: Quality & the "Efficiency Defense"
In many ways, Oliver Williamson foretold the shift away from per se
antitrust analyses. In 1968-more than fifteen years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers-Williamson

(output)." Sage & Hammer, supranote 1, at 257 n.61.
215. Other scholars have made similar criticisms of the modem antitrust regime and its
application to health care markets. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 100, at 320 ("By construing
consumer welfare to incorporate... intangibles like trustworthiness, antitrust decision
makers can and should give health care providers safe harbor to act collectively on nonprice
matters of concern to consumers."); Sage & Hammer, supra note 1, at 244 (arguing antitrust
law itself needs to be further revolutionized by placing less emphasis on price competition
and giving weight to the nonprice (quality) dimensions of health care); Jennifer R. Conners,
A CriticalMisdiagnosis: How Courts Underestimate the Anti-competitive Implications of
Hospital Mergers, 91 CAL. L. REv. 543, 549-50 (2003) (arguing that hospital "mergers may
detract substantially from the quality of patient care by eliminating the incentive for
hospitals to compete over nonprice factors such as better nursing, more specialists, and other
products and services"); Tomas Philipson, Managed Care and the Quality of Health Care: A
Misguided Debate?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 753, 758 (2001) (arguing that modern quality
regulations raise costs beyond profitable levels given HMOs' prevailing capitation rates).
216. See Sage & Hammer, supra note 1, at 261 ("From an economic perspective,
whether competition will help or harm the quality of health care depends upon whether
increases in quality can be translated into increases in profits. There are at least four different
ways that quality and profits can be related. First are demand-side models in which increases
in provider-specific quality either increase the price that providers can charge or the number
of patients seeking services. Second, quality and profits can be related through the provider's
production function.... Third, quality and profits can be related, sometimes perversely,
through various forms of risk selection.... Finally, certain forms of competition can destroy
value because of health care's strong relational character. Specifically, medical trust may
evaporate if consumers feel that health care is nothing more than a series of marketplace
decisions. This last consideration is not as remote from marketplace processes as it may
seem; trust and other hard-to-quantify social factors are necessary for private markets to be
viable institutions in the first place.").
217. Recognizing the importance of quality-based considerations, Sage and Hammer
have advocated coding and quantifying "quality" variables in antitrust analyses. See Peter J.
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM.
L. REv. 545, 555 (2002).
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counseled that market power paranoia threatens to undermine efficiencyenhancing innovations and to prevent potential Pareto optimality.215
Williamson argued that "economies" of both scale and scope should be an
effective antitrust defense that mitigates against a supplier's possible
accretion of market power.2 19 Williamson's thesis is almost universally
accepted today, but courts theretofore had explicitly rejected the notion that
market power is not anti-competitive in itself, and no showing of potential
"efficiency effects" would warrant a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis in
the wake of Klor's in the 1960s.22 °
Figure 1 is an attempt to formalize the insights underlying Williamson's
theory and the increasing popularity of rule-of-reason analyses of mergers
and joint ventures, in the context of an IPA, such as MedSouth. The
horizontal line, ACo, represents the level of average costs of two
independent fee-for-service practices, and AC 1 represents those firms'
average costs after they pool their resources to operate as a combined entity
under the aegis of MedSouth.2 2 1 Before MedSouth's formation, its wouldbe members are tiny independent players in a large and competitive market
that is dominated by large health care providers. Thus, before their
combination, the independent firms are unable to charge any price in excess
of ACo. After MedSouth's creation, however, its members' average
"prices" fall to AC (as the group of doctors coordinates activities by
sharing clinical information, coordinating treatment between primary care
doctors and specialists, developing practice protocols, and monitoring the
compliance of individuals in the group). It is important to note that the
definitions of "average cost" and "prices" used here reflect more than mere
pecuniary variation: MedSouth's clinical integration plans are premised on
the fact that new PA will be able to generate significant non-price or
quality-based efficiencies.22 2
In addition to creating efficiencies,
MedSouth's formation also spawns market power and empowers the group
to raise prices from Po to pi (as the IPA collectively negotiates prices with
payers and individual physicians continue to charge on an uncapitated fee218. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968).
219. Id. at 33-34.
220. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); see also supra
text accompanying note 125.
221. For or the sake of clarity, the analysis that follows treats "joint ventures" and
"mergers" as functional equivalents. While this assumption is imprecise, the essential
aspects of firms under either combination are similar or identical for the purposes of this
paper. Namely, firms in either a "joint venture" or "merger" setting are able to function
collectively and set prices, in the name of potential offsetting efficiencies. See VISCUSI ET
AL., supra note 2, at 199.
222. MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *1.
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for-service basis).
FIGURE 1: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PRICE-FIXING JOINT-VENTURES

'A, = JV

... s...........

A2

=

JV

As prices rise to pi and MedSouth rations the quantity of health care
goods and services it supplies (reducing output from q0 to qj), consumer
surplus decrea 'ses by the area of the vertically shaded triangle marked A,.
While A, represents a social cost, triangle A2 represents a social benefit
insofar as MedSouth is able to supply q, units of output more efficiently, at
a lower average cost than its individual physicians could have in
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MedSouth's absence. To the extent that the area of A2 exceeds that of Al,
MedSouth's formation is socially efficient, notwithstanding the IPA's
ability to raise prices and restrict output in the exercise of its newfound
market power.
We can calculate the percentage cost reductions that would be sufficient
to offset the changes in average cost, price, and quantity supplied in a
partial equilibrium model:

A,

I(ApXAq)
I
and

A 2 = (AAC )qi
2
Substituting for Aq from the definition of price elasticity, q,223
(Ap Xq 0 Ap)
NA=I
2
P0
And equating A, and A2 yields,

(AAC )q

1(Ap Xr/qoAp )

- 1
2

P0

Because ACo = po, the left side can be divided by A CoqI and the right side by poq 1 :

AA C

1 ( qo )(Ip

AC0

2

224

yq, A "0

223. Price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in quantity demanded
resulting from a 1% change in price. The value of the elasticity of demand for a product
varies depending on the level of price and quantity at which it is evaluated. In other words, at
different combinations of price and quantity demanded, the elasticity of demand for a
particular product can vary significantly. As a convention, elasticity measures reported in the
literature are typically evaluated at the mean value of price and quantity in the data used in
the estimation. In practice, the price elasticity of demand will always be negative. This
indicates that as the price of a good increases all other factors held constant, consumers will
demand less of that good. The magnitude of the elasticity estimate provides a measure of
how responsive demand is. If the value of the price elasticity estimate is greater than one in
absolute value, then demand is said to be elastic. When demand is elastic, consumers are
very responsive to changes in price. As such, a small price change will lead to a relatively
large change in quantity demanded. In contrast, if the value of the elasticity of demand
estimate is less than one in absolute value, then demand is said to be inelastic and consumers
are not very responsive to price changes. The demand for health care services is expected to
be relatively inelastic, in large part because there are few close substitutes for medical goods
and services. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION:
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 142, 144-46 (1979).
224.
This equation can be understood as a formalization of the "efficiency defense" for
horizontal price-fixing.
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Assuming a demand curve with constant elasticity,

Andthus, for I=l,

= 0.2; q

=1.2; and AAC

0.024.

That is, if a joint venture is expected to increase its prices by 20%, only a
2.4% cost reduction is required to equate the AI and A2 areas. If the joint
venture can generate efficiencies exceeding 2.4%, then society as a whole
benefits from the price-fixing arrangement, notwithstanding the 20%
increasein prices.
Similarly, we can calculate various cost reductions that are necessary to
offset percentage price increases for selected values of the elasticity of
demand (q/). See Table 1.
TABLE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR PRICE-FIXING JOINTVENTURES WITH CONSTANT DEMAND ELASTICITY

?1

AP
P
5

3

2

1

0.43

0.28

0.13

0.06

0.021

10
20

2.00
10.37

1.21
5.76

0.55
2.40

0.26
1.10

0.086
0.351

2

0.17

Although the range of price elasticity estimates varies widely in the
literature, a recent paper concluded that the average value of q tends to
center around -0.17, meaning that a 1% increase in the price of health care
will lead to a 0.17% reduction in health care expenditures. 2 25 Thus,
assuming that the health care market in the Denver metropolitan area
exhibits average demand elasticities, MedSouth would be able to offset
relatively large price increases with relatively modest efficiency
enhancements. For example, as Table 1 illustrates, a 5% price increase
would be offset by a 0.021% reduction in the IPA's system-wide costs;
similarly, a 20% price increase would be offset by a 0.351 percent
efficiency increase.
These results make sense clinically for two reasons: (1) the "efficiencies"
225.
(2002).

JEANNE

S.

RINGEL ET AL., THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE
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included in the model above include both price and nonprice variables (such
as quality), and (2) physicians control a large portion of both health care
costs and quality. Higher quality will often justify higher prices, and
recognizing the fact that physicians can control both cost and quality
variables requires a reconfiguration of our models of the health care
marketplace. Allowing physicians to capture the increased prices (in the
form of higher revenues for the joint venture) will give the IPA even greater
incentives to squeeze out higher efficiency enhancements from its "clinical
integration" protocols.
And by supplementing the typical demand
elasticities in health care markets with a definition of "efficiency" that
includes quality considerations, small efficiencies can justify rather large
price increases.
B. The Model's Caselaw Context
The model presented above is open to serious practical challenges,
insofar as measuring A1 and A 2 is difficult-if not hopelessly impracticable.
As the FTC has pointed out, cost savings are notoriously difficult for
antitrust authorities to authenticate because the firms under investigation are
the sole sources of price, quantity, and output information. 6 Judge Posner
has argued:
Not only is the measurement of efficiency... an intractable subject for
litigation; but an estimate of a challenged merger's cost savings could not
be utilized in determining the total economic effect of the merger unless
an estimate was also made of the monopoly costs of the merger-and we
simply do not know enough about the effect of marginal
increases in the
227
concentration ratio ... to predict the price effects.
As explained above, 228 Posner's refusal to countenance the "efficiency
defense" was consistent with courts' prevailing hostility towards horizontal
combinations during the first seventy years of the twentieth century.
Merger policy was based on rigid structural assumptions implying that high
degrees of concentration were harmful to the economy and thus should be
prohibited, even if they entailed improved efficiency. 229 The dominant
approach stressed the absolute value of competition as a regulatory tool
against market power's unqualified deleteriousness. 230 The Supreme Court
226. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089-90 (D.D.C. 1997).
227. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976).
228. See supra notes 124-141 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality"); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 570-71 (1972).
230. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470-71
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famously stated that a merger producing an anti-competitive effect "is not
saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial" 231 Accordingly, a merger was
categorically prohibited if it lessened competition substantially. Efficiency
entered into the debate, if at all, in determining the scope of the antitrust
rules. Based on this approach, agencies and courts developed unitary
market share rules for primafacie illegality, based on the presumption that
higher concentration creates negative effects on competition.23 2
United States v. Von's Grocery Co. 233 was the high-water mark for the
Supreme Court's hostility toward horizontal mergers, notwithstanding the
possibilities of efficiencies and economic counsel to the contrary. Von's
was the third largest grocery chain in the Los Angeles area in 1960 when it
acquired the sixth largest chain, Shopping Bag Food Stores. The combined
firm controlled only 7.5% of the market and remained a distant second to
the market leader, Safeway Stores.234 Despite Von's miniscule market
share, and despite the lack of evidence that the merged firm possessed any
market power, the Court struck down the merger as a violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.
Because the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act were explicitly motivated
by congressional intentions to protect small businesses, Von's turned on
nothing more than primafacieevidence of consolidation within the grocery
industry. The Court noted that the number of single-store grocery firms
decreased from 5,365 in 1950 to 3,818 in 1961, and by 1963 had dropped
still further to 3,590, while from 1953 to 1962 the number of chains with
two or more grocery stores increased from 96 to 150; moreover, small
companies were continually being absorbed by the larger firms through
mergers, and nine of the top twenty chains acquiring 126 stores from their
smaller competitors in the period from 1949 to 1958.235 The Court struck
down the merger, despite the lack of market power, and despite the
possibility of efficiency-enhancing synergies that might result from Von's
effective competition against Safeway because "the basic purpose of the
(1992), aff'g 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'g 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (observing that increased revenues from supercompetitive pricing could more
than offset lost revenues from decreased sales); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981) (defining
"market power" as "the ability of a firm (or group of firms, acting jointly)
to raise the price above competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the
price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded").
231. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
232. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328-29.
233. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
234. Id.at 272, 290.
235. Id. at 273.
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1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the
American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in
business. ,,216 In his sharp dissent, Justice Stewart famously lamented that
"[t]he sole consistency that I can find is that [under the majority's
interpretation of the Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts], the Government
always wins. 237
After Von's, legislative and judicial skepticism toward horizontal
combination and coordination began to relax. In 1974, the Supreme Court
handed the Department of Justice its first defeat on a market definition
issue, 238 and in 1976, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust

Improvements Act,239 which provides for the prior notification of large
proposed mergers to both the FTC and the DOJ's antitrust division.
Throughout the 1980s, federal authorities grew increasingly permissive of
horizontal combinations if participants in such combinations could carry the
burden of persuasion that their coordination produced significant
efficiencies.2 40 Importantly, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the
courts also began to broaden their interpretation of "efficiency" to include
non-price considerations, such as the quality of health care. 241 Then, in
1992, the DOJ and FTC jointly promulgated its landmark "Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 24 2 which made several important innovations in
236. Id. at 275.
237. Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
238. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (2004).
240. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC,, 526 U.S. 756, 794 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that Von's marked the beginning of an era of "gradual
evolution within the courts over a period of many years. That evolution represents an effort
carefully to blend the pro-competitive objectives of the law of antitrust with administrative
necessity. It represents a considerable advance, both from the days when the Commission
had to present and/or refute every possible fact and theory, and from antitrust theories so
abbreviated as to prevent proper analysis. The former prevented cases from ever reaching a
conclusion, and the latter called forth the criticism that the 'Government always wins."'
(internal citations omitted) (citing Von's, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
241. By admitting that providers can, and do, compete on more than mere price, courts
found it increasingly difficult to identify pernicious effects in market power. As the
definition of "efficiency" broadened to include price and quality, courts reasoned that one
provider's decision to raise price could easily be offset by another's decision to compete on
quality-based terms instead. For example, in Ball Mem. Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc.,
Judge Easterbrook described the meaning and implications of hospital market power:
"[The Hospitals] claim that the Blues have (and abused) 'market power,' the
ability to raise price significantly higher than the competitive level by restricting
output... [T]he Blues do not have the power to restrict output in the market or
to raise price because they furnish a fungible product that other people can and do
supply easily." 784 F.2d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
242. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
57 FED. REG. 41,552 (1992); 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,200.
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antitrust policy, including (1) the explicit definition of relevant product and
geographic markets,243 (2) the formalization of market concentration
indices, 244 and (3) the promulgation of "safe harbors" that are analogous to
those in the 1996 Health Care Statements. 45 By the late 1990s, lower
courts had explicitly adopted broad definitions of
"efficiency," which
246
specifically include non-price terms, such as quality.
The Supreme Court's post-Von's evolution culminated in California
Dental in 1999.247 Insofar as the Court opened the door to "efficiency
defenses" for horizontal combinations that were theretofore condemned
under a per se rule, some commentators are already describing California
Dental as a "major antitrust event ' 248 and "a watershed in the Court's
approach to Section One conduct., 249 In remanding the case to the FTC, the
Court endorsed a "sliding scale" approach, under which the degree of
inquiry used for particular competitors' collaborations would vary
according to their likely competitive effect.25 ° While the Court did not
243. 57 FED. REG. 41, 554-57.
244. 57 FED. REG. 41, 557-58. The DOJ and FTC adopted the HerfindahlHirschman Index ("HHI") to measure market concentration. Id. at 41,557. The HHI
is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the
f
participants,

HHI =

SS

2

.

Id. For example, a market consisting of four firms

i=1

with market shares of 30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and 20 percent has an HHI
of 2600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 2600). Id. at n.17
245. Id. at 41, 558. The "safe harbors" are defined according to the HHI. The HHI
ranges from 10,000 (in the case of a pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the
case of an atomistic market). The 1992 Merger Guidelines divide the spectrum of market
concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions that can be broadly characterized as
"unconcentrated" (HHI below 1000), "moderately concentrated" (HHI between 1000 and
1800), and "highly concentrated" (HHI above 1800). Id.
246. See, e.g., Sokol v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., No. 5:95CV1108, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22078, at *29 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1997) ("An antitrust plaintiff must show that challenged
conduct affected the price, quality or output of medical services available to consumers in
the relevant market."). In Sokol, the plaintiff claimed an anti-competitive effect with respect
to both the price and quality of cardiac care. Id. at *6. See also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Competition remains an essential
force in controlling costs and improving quality in health care.").
247. See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
248. Charles P. Weller, A New Rule of Reason from Justice Brandeis' "Concentric
Circles" and Other Changes in Law, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 881, 949 (1999). Mr. Weller
praises both the majority and dissenting opinions in CaliforniaDental: "Rarely in the history
of antitrust law have there been one, let alone two, civil, first-class and fascinating Supreme
Court antitrust opinions... CaliforniaDental is one of those rare cases." Id.
249. Piraino, supra note 43, at 1142.
250. The Court pointed out that "[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in
appraising reasonableness... [T]he quality of proof required should vary with the
circumstances." CaliforniaDental, 526 U.S. at 780 (citing PILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
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wholly discard its per se rule, the California Dental majority severely
limited the circumstances in which the analysis could be invoked. 25' Since
there was a plausible pro-competitive explanation for the California Dental
Association's advertising restrictions, the FTC and the Ninth Circuit should
not have indulged in a presumption as to their anti-competitive effects.252
Unfortunately, the Court neglected to explain how the sliding scale should
be applied,253 and many commentators have worried that the "sliding scale"
will eviscerate Maricopa's per se rule. 4 For better or for worse,
California Dental signaled the Court's willingness to consider the "procompetitive" justifications for even the most naked horizontal restraints and
its receptiveness to an "efficiency defense," such as the one presented
here.2 55
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that proper scrutiny of a horizontal
1507, at 402 (1986); William Kolasky, Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's
"Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 41, 43; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of
Reason: A New Standardfor Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1753, 1771
(1994)).
251. 526 U.S. at 769-70.
252. Justice Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion that the Court had no reason to
confuse Section One analysis by rejecting the Ninth Circuit's quick look approach.
CaliforniaDental, 526 U.S. at 781-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the Ninth
Circuit, in "applying ordinary antitrust principles, reached an unexceptional conclusion." Id.
at 793. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's quick look approach was "the same legal conclusion that
this Court itself reached in IndianaFederation."Id.Breyer argued that consumers were even
more likely to be adversely affected by the dentists' advertising restrictions in California
Dental than by the Indiana dentists' refusal to supply x-rays, which the Court had summarily
condemned in Indiana Federation.Id. There was, therefore, no reason for the majority to
reject a quick look analysis of the advertising restrictions. Id. at 793-94.
253. The Court created a Section One continuum, but did nothing to differentiate its
categories. Instead, the majority simply stated that no categorical line can be "drawn
between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anti-competitive effect
and those that call for more detailed treatment." Id.at 780-81; See also Marina Lao,
Comment, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving Professionals, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 526 (2000) ("[T]here are no rules for determining where a particular
restraint should fall on the continuum and, hence, the appropriate standard of proof in each
case."). Lao refers to the opinion as "an enigma." Id.at 508.
254. See Stephen Calkins, CaliforniaDentalAssociation: Not a Quick Look but Not the
Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000); William J.Kolasky, California Dental
Association v. FTC: The New Antitrust Empiricism, ANTITRUST, Fall 1999, at 68, 70 ("Many
have expressed concern that California Dental may make summary disposition of antitrust
cases, short of a full-blown rule of reason analysis, more difficult. The Court, however, goes
out of its way to make clear that this is not its intent .. . The point is simply that in
California Dental itself, the Ninth Circuit needed to take a more careful ('more sedulous')
look than it did.").
255. Havighurst worries that "[t]he Supreme Court, it seems, has opened the door for
market-failure defenses much wider than is prudent." Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a
(Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J.HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 942, 952 (2001).
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merger or joint venture-under federal caselaw or the FTC and DOJ's
competition guidelines-required thorough and complex cost-benefit
analyses. 256 Thus, it is in this context of messy and fact-specific market
analyses that the model presented here is more useful. Having committed
themselves to systematic market analyses, and having responsibility for an
industry that is facing increased pressures toward horizontal coordination
and/or mergers, 257 the federal antitrust authorities-and the firms they
regulate-could benefit greatly from clarifying and formalizing the
boundaries of their "safe harbors." In the next section, I draw a rough
sketch of the formal application of the "efficiency defense" model to
MedSouth.
C. The Model's Application to MedSouth
The model outlined above fits easily within the FTC's analysis in its
MedSouth Opinion Letter. 258 The FTC, at least implicitly, seems to have
adopted the "efficiency defense" model insofar as the Commission blessed
the proposed IPA, notwithstanding their finding that "the MedSouth
membership as presently constituted likely would be able to exercise
significant market power, and thus to extract higher prices., 259 The relevant
inquiry thus becomes whether the IPA's cost-saving efficiencies are
sufficient to offset the potentially pernicious effects of its market power.
Ideally, an inquiry into the pro- and anti-competitive effects of
MedSouth's business practices would compare pricing and output data from
each of the IPA's 432 physicians in 216 practices both before and after
MedSouth's formation. Unfortunately, the practicality of this best-case
scenario is undermined by two factors. First, revenue and output data from
individual physicians' practices are currently unavailable. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, any analysis of MedSouth's competitive effects
is necessarily prospective in nature, and such an analysis therefore requires
a host of simplifying assumptions that may or may not be borne out in

256. JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 63 (3d ed. 1998)
(noting how far antitrust caselaw and administrative procedures have diverged from Von 's).
257. See sources cited supra note 211.
258. See MedSouth Staff Opinion, supra note 10, at *9 ("The fundamental concern of
antitrust analysis is whether a given arrangement may have a substantial anti-competitive
effect and, if so, whether that potential effect is offset by any pro-competitive efficiencies
resulting from the conduct. The central question is whether, taking into account both
potential pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, the arrangement is likely to harm
competition by increasing the ability or incentive of the participants to raise price above--or
reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below-the level that likely would prevail in
the absence of the agreement." (citations omitted)).
259. Id.
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actuality.26 °
While necessarily an imperfect proxy, hospital data provide possible
insights into potential efficiency effects of MedSouth's formation. Courts
often insist on quantitative economic evidence in antitrust litigation, such as
sales volume, customer flows, market concentration, price, costs, revenues,
and the like, and hospital data provides at least a rough estimate of the
health care practices physicians are using to drive the institution's charges
and revenues. 261 Despite its shortcomings, hospital data can be used to
analyze MedSouth's likely competitive effects because (1) MedSouth's
would-be participants are concentrated in only three of Denver's
hospitals; 262 (2) MedSouth's would be-participants are (fairly) evenly
distributed across subspecialties that generate both high and low levels of
charges and revenues for their respective hospitals; 263 and (3) revenue and
charge data for
each of Denver's hospitals are publicly available and easily
264
comparable.

260. Inter alia, we must assume that the 432 physicians who have expressed interest in
the IPA will indeed participate; and of course, we can only make assumptions about the
pricing and output decisions that each of MedSouth's members will make when confronted
with Denver's newly competitive health care landscape in the future.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 987 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (rejecting government's claim of reduced non-price competition and demanding
quantitative evidence of post-merger hospital prices and output).
262. All MedSouth physicians have a practice location in South Denver, and staff
privileges at one of the three hospitals located in that area: Swedish Medical Center, Porter
Adventist Hospital, and Littleton Adventist Hospital. The other Denver-area hospitals are
Denver Health Medical Center, Exempla Lutheran Medical Center, Exempla Saint Joseph
Hospital, North Suburban Medical Center, Platte Valley Medical Center, Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center, Rose Medical Center, St. Anthony Hospitals, The Children's
Hospital, The Medical Center of Aurora, and the University of Colorado Hospital.
263. MedSouth's current members are 51% of the internists and 33% of the family
practitioners at Swedish Hospital, and from 50% to 100% of the specialists in 19 other
practice areas at that hospital (allergy/immunology, cardiology, endocrinology,
hematology/oncology, infectious disease, nephrology, neurology, oncology, pulmonary
medicine, radiology, rheumatology, hand surgery, neurosurgery, pathology, podiatric
surgery, urology, vascular surgery, pediatric cardiology, and pediatric neurology). They are
44% of the family practice physicians and 48% of the internists at the two Adventist
hospitals, and from 50% to 100% of the specialists in 21 other fields at those two hospitals
(allergy, cardiology, cardiovascular surgery, endocrinology, gastroenterology, gynecology.
infectious diseases, nephrology, neurology, neurosurgery, oncology, otolaryngology,
otology, pathology, podiatry, pulmonology, radiation oncology, radiology, rheumatology,
hand surgery, and urology).
264.
See COLORADO HEALTH & HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
FINANCIAL AND UTILIZATION DATA (2002).
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TABLE

2: AGGREGATE QUANTITY AND PRICE DATA FOR DENVER-AREA
HOSPITALS
Uncollected
Charges

Revenues

$1,334,299,134

$891,157,758

$443,141,376

$584,131,743

$326,137,205

$257,994,538

$495,070,793

$17,195,070

$477,875,723

Patient
Days

Inpatient
Charges

Outpatient
Charges

Total Charges

Medicare

215,183

$1,007,796,041

$326,503,093

Medicaid

98,314

$427,917,855

$156,213,888

Self Pay

55,410

$246,137,199

$248,933,594

2,707

$14,304,247

$9,372,766

$23,677,013

$11,250,664

$12,426,349

Mang. Care

378,270

$1,940,734,866

$1,167,838,986

$3,108,573,852

$1,801,422,410

$1,307,151,442

Commercial

51,653

$289,061,385

$176,253,307

$465,314,692

$108,903,670

$356,411,022

Others

72,629

$276,289,072

$302,656,360

$578,945,432

$301,286,617

$277,658,815

Total

874,166

$4,202,240,665

$2,387,771,994

$6,590,012,659

$3,457,353,394

$3,132,659,265

Champus

TABLE

3:

AGGREGATE QUANTITY AND PRICE DATA FOR MEDSOUTHAFFILIATED HOSPITALS

Patient
Days

Ipatiet Chages

Outpatient
Charges

Total Charges

Uncollected
Charges

Revenues

Medicare

64,380

$237,219,915

$71,702,380

$308,922,296

$216,236,613

$92,685,683

Medicaid

5,363

$20,284,710

$7,567,564

$27,852,273

$18,115,565

$9,736,708

Self Pay

7,563

$23,287,091

$14,568,564

$37,855,654

$0

$37,855,654

Champus

0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

Mang. Care

95,146

$379,739,453

$280,629,546

$660,368,999

$350,759,107

$309,609,892

Commercial

10,094

$49,561,554

$36,178,497

$85,740,051

$22,330,080

$63,409,970

$145,836,981

$110,100,229

$35,736,751

$1,266,576,254

$717,541,595

$549,034,659

Uncollected
Charges

Revenues

Others

25,350

$102,827,057

$43,009,924

Total

207,896

$812,919,779

$453,656,474

TABLE

4: MEDSOUTH MARKET SHARES
Ttal

Patient Days

Inpatient
Char es

Outpatient
Chares

Medicare

29.92%

23.54%

21.96%

23.15%

24.26%

20.92%

Medicaid

5.45%

4.74%

4.84%

4.77%

5.55%

3.77%

Self Pay

13.65%

9.46%

5.85%

7.65%

0.00%

7.92%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

21.24%

19.47%

23.69%
17.79%

Champus

Charges

Mang. Care

25.15%

19.57%

24.03%

Commercial

19.54%

17.15%

20.53%

18.43%

20.50%

Others

34.90%

37.22%

14.21%

25.19%

36.54%

12.87%

Total

23.78%

19.34%

19.00%

19.22%

20.75%

17.53%

Applying the equation accompanying note 224, supra, to the data
presented in Tables 2-4, the model presented here would provide MedSouth
with an "efficiency defense" for possible price increases that may follow
the formation of the IPA-joint venture. For example, from Table 1 we
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know that a 5% price increase would be offset by a 0.02 1%reduction in the
IPA's system-wide costs; similarly, a 20% price increase would be offset by
a 0.351% efficiency increase. These calculations from Table 1 can be
applied to any appropriate price and quantity combination from Tables 2-4
to determine the cost justifiability of MedSouth's operations. Thus, if we
take the average total charges per patient-day as a proxy for "efficiency,"
Table 5 presents sample calculations for offsetting price increases for
corresponding demand-price elasticities.265
TABLE 5: SAMPLE "EFFICIENCY DEFENSE" CALCULATIONS FOR
MEDSOUTH

17

AP
P

0.17

3

2

1

5

$25.93

10

$120.62

$16.89
$72.97

$7.84
$33.17

$3.62
$15.68

$1.27
$5.19

20

$625.40

$347.37

$144.74

$66.34

$21.17

2

According to Table 5, if we assume the health care market exhibits a
constant demand-price elasticity of 0.17,266 and if we assume "average
charges per patient-day" are a suitable proxy for an IPA's efficiency,
MedSouth would be able to justify a 5 percent increase in its prices by a
reduction of $1.27 in charges per patient-day, and the IPA-joint venture
could justify a 20 percent increase in prices by an offsetting reduction of
$21.17 in charges per patient-day. Of course, average charges per patientday are a poor proxy for system-wide costs, but Table 5 at least gives an
illustrative example for the application of the model presented here.
Even outside of the model presented here, MedSouth is highly unlikely
to garner antitrust scrutiny or condemnation. As Tables 2-4 illustrate,
MedSouth's physicians have the potential to exercise only a modest degree
of market power. The "Revised Joint Statement" indicated, inter alia, that
the federal agencies would not challenge, absent extraordinary
'circumstances, physician network joint ventures whose membership totals
20% or less of the physicians in a relevant geographic market and 20% or
less of the physicians in each specialty within that market.267 Given the fact
265. MedSouth's average charges per patient-day can be calculated from Table 3 to be
$6,030.82 ($1,266,576,254/207,896).
266. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
267. Dept. of Justice & U.S. Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy
and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Careand Antitrust, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 67, at 764 (Sept. 27, 1994). The statement contains an exception for small
communities with less than five physicians in a given practice. The exception states that in
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that the FTC has never monitored a physician joint venture after granting
conditional approval in an advisory opinion,26 8 and given the fact that the
federal enforcement agencies have focused their limited resources on
prosecuting near-monopolies and naked cartels,269 the model presented
above suggests MedSouth is particularly unlikely to face further scrutiny
from the FTC or DOJ. Even if the agencies filed complaints against
MedSouth and its members, the sanctions recently imposed upon two
medical groups in Denver for price-fixing and the orchestration of boycotts
270
suggest MedSouth has little to fear from the federal authorities.
Even given the data presented in Tables 2-4, private plaintiffs could
challenge MedSouth's compliance with the federal antitrust laws and force
the IPA to defend itself under the rule of reason. The likelihood that
MedSouth will be challenged by a rival HMO or one of its contracting
insurers appears even greater when considered in light of the practical
difficulties inherent in MedSouth's proposal, and given the fact that
MedSouth's competitors have enormous incentives to try and squelch the
relevant markets with less than five physicians in a particular specialty, a physician network
joint venture otherwise qualifying for the antitrust safety zone may include one physician
from that specialty even though the inclusion of that physician results in a physician network
joint venture consisting of more than 20 percent of the physicians in that specialty. See
Hassan v. Indep. PracticeAssoc., 698 F. Supp. 679, 694 (E.D. Mich. 1988). The court, citing
Jefferson Parish, held that a 20% market share did not constitute sufficient market power in
light of competition from other providers in the area. Id.
268. See Christopher Brown, FTC Commissioner Calls for Monitoring of ClinicalIntegrationExperiment, I1 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 567 (Apr. 18, 2002).
269. See Greaney, supra note 6, at 190 (noting that "the federal enforcement agencies
have been slow to challenge physician or other provider networks.... Generally, they have
targeted only near-monopolies and outright cartels. Further, the agencies' advisory opinions
in many cases have generously extended the safe-harbor limits contained in their own policy
statements. Consequently, many private attorneys advise clients that it is a relatively low risk
proposition to form networks that encompass large segments of the market. In sum,
agencies' failure to back up their advisory opinions with enforcement actions may have
undermined the prophylactic potential of their advisories.").
270. See In re Physician Integrated Servs. of Denver, Inc., 2002 F.T.C. 27 (May 13,
2002), 2002 F.T.C. LEXIS 27; In re Physician Integrated Servs. of Denver, Inc., 2002 F.T.C.
38 (July 16, 2002), 2002 F.T.C. LEXIS 38. Under the settlements, the defendants were
prohibited from entering into, participating in, or facilitating: (1) any agreement to negotiate
on behalf of physicians with any payor or provider; (2) any agreement to deal, or to refuse to
deal, with any payor or provider; (3) any agreement regarding any term or condition on
which physicians deal, or are willing to deal, with any payor; or (4) any agreement not to
deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor through any arrangement
other than PISD or AAPCP. The order would also barred defendants from exchanging or
facilitating the exchange of information concerning any physician's willingness to deal with
a payor, or the terms or conditions on which any physician is willing to deal with a payor.
Both orders provided that the defendants could participate in a "qualified risk-sharing joint
arrangement" or a "qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement," so long as they do not
prevent the participating physicians from contracting individually or through other
arrangements.
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IPA's "clinical integration" model at its incipiency. Recognizing the
horizontally collusive threat its business model poses, and facing the
administrative nightmare posed by its clinical integration plans, MedSouth
might do well to supplement its IPA with some form of financial risksharing. The 1996 Health Care Statements are silent with respect to the
methods the FTC would use to analyze such a hybrid joint venture, but the
Supreme Court's decision in California Dental suggests that a horizontal
combination of professional service providers would at least garner a
presumption of pro-competitive efficiencies.2 71
V. CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of perceived widespread dissatisfaction with the
state of the health care industry in the latter-half of 1990s, 272 MedSouth can
be understood as part of a larger physician-sponsored backlash against
managed care organizations. For example, in a documentary on physicians'
drives to unionize, CBS News reported:
Dr. Janice Nelson: "And this is why we want to stick together as a group
of physicians, so that our voices be heard [sic], because for so long,
they've been totally ignored."
argue that t]here's
strength in numbers when negotiating with managed care firms."
Bill Whitaker (CBS News reporter): "[Physicians

care about one
Dr. Sam Fink: "An insurance company does not
thousand."'273

practitioner. They might care about a few

Insofar as the continued power struggle between physicians and managed
care organizations has continued to manifest itself in new and different
271.

See supra notes 248-255 and accompanying text.

272. See Ardyth J. Eisenberg, When HMO Patients Can't Get No Satisfaction, 4
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 367, 367-68 (2001); Christine E. Brasel, Managed Care
Liability: State Legislation May Arm Angry Members with Legal Ammo to Fire at Their
MCOs for Cost Containment Tactics... But Could it Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 449,
451 (1999); David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1061 (1999); Robert L. Lowes, Explaining Things to an Angry

Managed-CarePatient, 74 MED. ECON. 143 (1997); Edward B. Hirshfeld et al., Structuring
Provider-SponsoredOrganizations:The Legal and Regulatory Hurdles, 20 J.LEGAL MED.

297, 301 (1999) ("highly credible physician leaders began to criticize managed care health
plans for not doing enough to assure and improve the quality of care"); Julie Marquis,
Doctors Who Lose Patience, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 425-29 (1997).

273. CBS Sunday Morning News, Doctors Find a Need to Unionize, 1999 WL
16204167 (Aug. 8, 1999).
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forms, there can be little doubt that one of the primary motivations behind
the formation of MedSouth was its participants' collective desire to retake
some of the bargaining power they were forced to cede in previous years. 274
With the FTC's Staff Opinion under its belt, MedSouth has climbed an
enormous mountain. The federal enforcement agencies are understaffed and
underfunded, and the likelihood that the FTC will monitor, much less sue to
enforce, MedSouth's compliance with its integration proposal is slim. Even
after winning the battle at the FTC, MedSouth still might lose the larger
antitrust war. The administrative costs required to get the "virtual IPA"
model off the ground will be enormous, and MedSouth may financially
self-destruct, just like the traditional HMOs to which MedSouth was
supposed to be an alternative. If MedSouth succeeds, the novelty of its
business model may continue to attract attention from both public and
private potential plaintiffs who would condemn the IPA as anti-competitive.
In addition to implementing the initial logistics of its integration plans,
MedSouth will face continued administrative costs in its daily operations. 75
There may be strength in numbers, but big is not always beautiful.
Many of MedSouth's remaining problems, from its administrative costs
to the practicalities of its technological and clinical integration plans, cannot
be remedied by antitrust policy. Insofar as health care policymakers desire
to give incentives to would-be innovators to devise inventive ways to cut
costs and improve quality, they would do well to recognize both the
problems and possibilities posed by MedSouth's formation and potential
success. Modernizing health care antitrust law to include non-price
variables in a formalized model like the one presented here would go a long
way towards removing the sword of Damocles that has heretofore made an
IPA-joint venture far too much of an "adventure."

274. Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, 16 HEALTH AFF. 171, 174-75 (1997)
("Physicians get involved in integrated delivery system activities or sell their practices for
defensive reasons: to take back some of the control they have ceded to managed care...");
Margaret Gibelman & Leila Whiting, Negotiating and Contracting in a Managed Care
Environment: Considerationsfor Practitioners,24 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 180 (1999), 1999
WL 13101563, at *14, *16 ("To obtain the managed care contract or get on the list of
preferred providers, practitioners must be willing to negotiate their fees... (which) means a
lowering of fees to be competitive... Another implication for practice lies in the increased
importance of affiliating with independent practice associations ... (because they) afford the
independent practitioner the potential benefits of specialization among group members,
greater negotiating ability (there is validity to the slogan 'power in numbers') and spreading
of risk").
275. In addition to enforcing its clinical guidelines and utilization review, MedSouth
will also be forced to discipline sub-par physician participants. The Staff Opinion suggests
MedSouth will retain the right to expel its members, if necessary. MedSouth Staff Opinion,
supra note 10, at *4.
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